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such as clearinghouses associated with securities exchanges. This Article asks whether
regulators should expand the central clearing requirement to nonderivative financial
contracts, such as loan agreements. This Article begins by theorizing how and why
central clearing can reduce systemic risk. It then examines the theory’s regulatory and
economic eﬃciency implications, first for current requirements to centrally clear
derivatives contracts and thereafter for deciding whether to extend those requirements
to nonderivative contracts. The inquiry has real practical importance because the
aggregate monetary exposure on nonderivative financial contracts—and thus the
potential systemic risk that could be triggered by that exposure—greatly exceeds that
on derivatives contracts. The inquiry also raises fundamental legal questions as to
why (and the extent to which) regulators should tell financial institutions how to
control risk and whether to require the mutualization of risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 (the “financial crisis”), an
increasing number of countries, including the United States, have been
requiring most derivatives contracts to be cleared1 and settled2 through central
counterparties (CCPs).3 CCPs are typically well-capitalized entities,4 often
associated with derivatives, commodities, or other securities exchanges.5 The
CCP legally substitutes its credit for that of the contracting parties, making the
CCP the primary counterparty on both sides of the contract—for example, the
buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.6 The CCP thus ensures the
1 Clearing is “the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming transfer orders
prior to settlement.” EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED TO PAYMENT,
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2009), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2YK-9EQV]. It
involves identifying the obligations of the parties to the transaction.
2 Settlement is “the completion of a transaction or of processing with the aim of discharging
participants’ obligations through the transfer of funds and/or securities.” Id. at 24.
3 See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
4 Rather than having large equity cushions, CCPs are usually indirectly capitalized through
the resources of their clearing members. See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text.
5 The three largest U.S. clearinghouses, for example, are CME Clearing Services, which provides
clearing and settlement of exchange trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board
of Trade; ICE Clear U.S., which is owned by Intercontinental Exchange, an entity that also owns the
New York Stock Exchange; and LCH, which is a unit of the London Stock Exchange Group. See Clearing
Firms, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/ﬁnancial-and-regulatory-surveillance/
clearing-firms.html?redirect=/tools-information/clearing-firms.html [https://perma.cc/TPY2-2TBE];
Michelle Price, Three Biggest U.S. Clearing Houses Pass Liquidity Stress Tests: CFTC, REUTERS (Oct. 16,
2017, 12:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cftc-clearing-tests/three-biggest-u-s-clearinghouses-pass-liquidity-stress-tests-cftc-idUSKBN1CL09Q [https://perma.cc/6PJJ-A9SJ].
6 See PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS 7-8 (2011); cf. R. BLISS & C. PAPATHANASSIOU,
EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, DERIVATIVES CLEARING, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES AND NOVATION:
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 3 (2006), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/ccp/
BlissPapathanassiou_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/95F2-MJZU] (observing that the original “bilateral
contract between two market participants is replaced by two bilateral contracts between each of the
original counterparties and the CCP”); Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 862 (2014) (“The clearinghouse interposes itself between the parties, serving as
the counterparty to each. Instead of selling the cattle future to Buyer, Seller sells it to the clearinghouse,
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performance of a financial contract even if a contracting party fails,7 thereby
reducing counterparty risk8—the risk that a contracting party’s default will harm
other parties to the contract. Regulators believe this reduction of counterparty
risk will reduce “systemic” risk9—the risk that, in this context, a failure of one
or more counterparties could lead to events that impair the financial system’s
ability to function as a network10 and cause an economic collapse.11
This emerging regulatory norm raises the question on which this Article
focuses: should regulators also require other types of ﬁnancial contracts
(hereinafter “nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts”) to be centrally cleared and
settled, in order to reduce systemic risk?12 This inquiry has real practical
importance because the aggregate counterparty exposure13 on nonderivative

which sells an identical future to Buyer.”). The substitution of credit is legally referred to as a “novation,”
which arises when a new party assumes a payment obligation that was incurred by a debtor on a contract
and the original debtor is totally released from the obligation. 66 C.J.S. Novation § 1 (2019).
7 NORMAN, supra note 6, at 7.
8 Id. at 9. Central clearing more technically reduces counterparty credit risk, a type of
counterparty risk that is sometimes called default risk.
9 The reduction of counterparty risk might reduce systemic risk but cannot eliminate it because
counterparty failure is not the only cause of systemic risk. Other factors, such as the failure of financial
markets, can trigger systemic risk. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200-02 (2008).
10 ”Systemic risk” refers generally to the risk that the ﬁnancial system could fail to function as
a network. Id. at 204, 207-08. The term “macroprudential regulation” refers to regulation designed
to mitigate systemic risk. Cf. Douglas J. Elliott, Greg Feldberg & Andreas Lehnert, The History of
Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States 6 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics
Discussion Series No. 2013-29, 2013) (observing that the goal of macroprudential regulation “is to
manage factors that could endanger the ﬁnancial system as a whole, even if they would not be
obvious as serious threats when viewed in the context of any single institution”); Robert Hockett,
Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal Considerations 4 (Jan. 20, 2013)
(unpublished draft prepared for the International Monetary Fund) (available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2340316) (deﬁning the term “macroprudential” as a “preﬁx [used] in ﬁnance-regulatory
contexts, pertaining to the reduction of risks that imperil ﬁnancial systems . . . as wholes”). In
contrast, “microprudential” regulation “is concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of
individual institutions, markets, or infrastructures.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 47th Annual Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision
and Regulation 2 (May 5, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7P5-Y7CV]).
11 The events that lead to that impairment are not limited to a domino-like collapse of ﬁnancial
institutions but could include changes in behavior of market participants in response to a
counterparty’s failure.
12 I ﬁrst raised this question at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago workshop, Legal
Arrangements for Cross-Border Resolution and Liquidity in OTC Derivative Markets: Theoretical
Insights from “A Legal Theory of Finance” and Other Contemporary Perspectives, on June 14, 2014.
13 Counterparty exposure is the amount of default risk to which a counterparty is subject. See, e.g.,
Counterparty Credit Exposure for Swaps, FINANCIALCAD CORP., http://www.fincad.com/resources/
resource-library/article/counterparty-credit-exposure-swaps [https://perma.cc/DFC4-8ZT7]. “Aggregate
counterparty exposure” is the aggregate counterparty exposure after netting any offsetting counterparty
obligations. The reader should not confuse that concept with the term “net aggregate liability,” which
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ﬁnancial contracts—and thus the systemic risk that could be triggered by that
exposure—greatly exceeds that on derivatives contracts.14 Centrally clearing
derivatives contracts through CCPs also has a “unique feature”: the
“mutualization of default losses.”15 Expanding central clearing to
nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts therefore raises fundamental issues about
whether regulators should require ﬁnancial institutions to mutualize losses in
order to control systemic risk.16
To answer its question, this Article ﬁrst shows that regulators require
central clearing of derivatives contracts because they assume—driven in part
by media pressure—that those contracts are inherently systemically risky.17
This Article then explains why that assumption is misleading: the systemic
riskiness of derivatives contracts comes not from their inherent nature but,
rather, from their systemically important counterparties.18 Finally, this
Article uses that insight to theorize and argue as to when regulation should
require central clearing for nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.19

refers to a CCP finding itself liable for an amount that it cannot set off against its clearing members.
See infra notes 167, 171 and accompanying text.
14 At yearend 2013, for example, the amount at risk (or “gross market value”) on outstanding
bonds alone was $91 trillion. SIFMA RESEARCH DEP’T, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2017
FACT BOOK 55 (2017), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/public-statements/
10_US-Fact-Book-2017-SIFMA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EER-KQZ5]. That amount is many times
larger than the $19 trillion of risk exposure on derivatives. MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVE STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER
2013, at 2 (2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1405.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR2K-6UJG]; cf.
Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics: Credit Risk Management, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/credit_risk.htm [https://perma.cc/
6U7C-L282] (last updated Mar. 1, 2019) (“For most banks, loans are the largest and most obvious
source of credit risk. However, there are other sources of credit risk both on and oﬀ the balance
sheet [including] credit derivatives [and derivatives involving] foreign exchange . . . .”). This Article
later explains why gross market value, and not “notional amount,” is the proper metric for comparing
risk exposure. See infra note 105.
15 Robert T. Cox & Robert S. Steigerwald, A CCP Is a CCP Is a CCP 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi., Working Paper No. PDP 2017-01, 2017). One reviewer of this Article called “the mutualisation
of risk . . . one of the most important private ordering beneﬁts of CCPs, one that is often
overlook[ed].” Email Attachment from Paolo Saguato, Assistant Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia
Law Sch., George Mason Univ., to author (Jan. 13, 2018, 8:51 PM) (on ﬁle with author).
16 Mutualizing a risk of loss (and hence the resulting losses) refers to dividing it among
multiple parties to reduce the chance that its occurrence will cause signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss to any
one party. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 40–59 and accompanying text.
19 Cf. Theory, OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1980) (deﬁning “theory” as “a set of ideas
formulated (by reasoning from known facts) to explain something”).
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A. Terminology
This analysis builds on the following foundational terminology.
Consistent with ﬁnancial industry shorthand, references to “clearing” also
include settlement, and references to “central clearing” mean the clearing
(and thus settlement) of contracts through CCPs. Central clearing of a
nonderivative ﬁnancial contract therefore means using a CCP to transmit,
reconcile, and conﬁrm each transfer to be made under the contract,20 and then
to complete the transfer by paying funds or assigning securities as needed to
satisfy counterparty obligations thereunder.21 The term “counterparty”
means, depending on the context, either the contracting parties themselves
or a CCP acting as a central counterparty. Applying these terms, central
clearing of a loan agreement—which exempliﬁes a straightforward
nonderivative ﬁnancial contract—means using a CCP (acting as a central
counterparty) to monitor the amount and dates of payments to be made
thereunder and to make each such payment, when due, to the (counterparty)
lender on behalf of the (counterparty) borrower.22
References to a “financial contract” mean any contract—exemplified above
by a loan agreement—that governs a financial or financing transaction.23 A
derivatives contract is a specific type of financial contract: it is one that derives
its value from the future performance of an underlying asset, index, or other
reference entity.24 In that sense, it is a “bet” on that future underlying
performance.25 For example, Party A may enter into a derivatives contract
today to sell 1000 shares of XYZ stock, currently having a market value of $70
per share, to Party B a year from now, at that same price. If in a year the market

See supra note 1 and accompanying text (deﬁning clearing of derivatives contracts).
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (deﬁning settlement of derivatives contracts).
As discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 6, this reﬂects that the CCP legally
substitutes its credit for that of the contracting parties, making the CCP the primary counterparty
on both sides of the contract—in the case of loan agreements, the CCP serves as the lender to every
borrower and the borrower to every lender.
23 In principle, this Article addresses central clearing of any type of nonderivative ﬁnancial
contract. That includes not only loan agreements but also other standard types of ﬁnancial contracts,
such as bond indentures, commercial paper agreements, repo agreements, guarantees, and standby
letters of credit, and perhaps even other types of contracts that allocate monetary risk such as
insurance. Mutualizing insurance risk through CCPs, for example, might have the potential to
replace state guarantee funds or even to reduce the need for reinsurance, which creates its own major
risks. See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1569, 1613-18 (2014) (discussing the risks of the opaque reinsurance industry).
24 Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2011).
25 See id. (observing that derivatives contracts are “bets,” being “agreements between parties
that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by whether or not a particular event
occurs in the future”).
20
21
22
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value of XYZ stock has fallen to $50 per share, Party A would benefit.26 But if
that market value had instead risen to $80 per share, Party B would benefit.27
B. Historical Context
The move to require central clearing of derivatives contracts assumes that
derivatives contracts are unusually systemically risky and, indeed, were a cause
of the financial crisis.28 The media portrayed American International Group
(AIG)—which was potentially liable under multiple credit-default swaps
(CDS), a type of derivatives contract,29 to investors in mortgage-backed

26 Party A could, for example, purchase the 1000 shares at $50 per share and immediately resell
them to Party B at the agreed-upon $70 per share, making a $20 per share proﬁt. Or the parties could
settle the contract by the simple payment of that net amount by Party B to Party A.
27 In a parallel to the previous scenario, Party B could purchase the 1000 shares from A at $70
per share and immediately resell them at $80, making a $10 per-share proﬁt, or the parties could
settle the contract by having Party A pay the net amount to Party B.
28 See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, DODD-FRANK’S TITLE VII – OTC DERIVATIVES REFORM 1 (2013),
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Key_questions_board_members_should_ask_about_Title_
VII/$FILE/Americas_FAAS_Dodd_Frank_derivatives_reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV54-ZDJS]
(“Congress viewed the lack of regulation of OTC derivatives transactions as exacerbating the 2008
financial crisis . . . [s]ince the trades were not regulated, the amount of market participants’ exposures
throughout the financial system could not be quantified . . . . Title VII aims to reduce systemic risk
through mandating central clearing of previously unregulated derivative instruments . . . .”). To some
extent also, the move to require central clearing of derivatives contracts might indirectly respond to
certain precrisis publicized losses on derivatives contracts, such as the highly publicized losses incurred
by Orange County, California, and Gibson Greetings. Cf. Dan Awrey, Toward a Supply-Side Theory of
Financial Innovation, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 401, 406 (2013) (observing that “a series of high profile
derivatives-related scandals involving market participants such as Orange County [and] Gibson
Greetings” prompted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to issue “a Concept
Release in May 1998 announcing its intention to fundamentally re-examine its approach toward the
regulation of OTC derivatives markets . . . as part of a comprehensive reform effort designed to update
the CFTC’s oversight of both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives markets” and seeking “comment
on a number of specific areas of potential reform including” clearing).
29 To understand a CDS, a special type of derivatives contract sometimes called a “credit
derivative,” consider the example of Party A making a loan to Party B. If Party A is concerned about
Party B’s ability to repay the loan, Party A (in this capacity, the protection buyer) may enter into a CDS
contract with Party C (the protection seller) under which Party C agrees to make any payments that
Party B fails to make. In exchange for this protection, Party A pays Party C a fee. See, e.g., Understanding
Investing: Credit Default Swaps, PACIFIC INV. MGMT. CO., LLC, https://www.pimco.com/en-us/
resources/education/understanding-credit-default-swaps [https://perma.cc/934H-ZLRZ]. Protection
sellers may enter into many CDS contracts, thereby earning fee income while helping market
participants to hedge risk. Although documented as a derivatives contract on International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) forms, a CDS contract is fundamentally a guarantee. Cf.
Leonard Ng, Credit Default Swaps, Guarantees and Insurance Policies: Same Eﬀect, Diﬀerent Treatment?,
2010 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 664, 664-66 (observing that U.K. ﬁnancial and
insurance law treats CDS contracts and guarantees similarly in many important respects, in sharp
contrast with how it treats “insurance contracts” with which they are sometimes confused).
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securities (MBS)30—as a “poster child” for that crisis.31 The collapse of the
MBS market threatened AIG’s financial integrity as panicking investors
commenced collection actions on their CDS contracts.32 Observers believe
that, absent its government bailout, AIG would have collapsed and caused
massive systemic harm.33 Although his statement is often taken out of context,
Warren Buffet added fuel to the fire by famously referring to derivatives
contracts as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”34

30 See Christoph Henkel, Harmonizing European Union Bank Resolution: Central Clearing of OTC
Derivative Contracts Maintaining the Status Quo of Safe Harbors, 22 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81, 97-98 (2013) (explaining that AIG was “unable to post suﬃcient collateral to ensure
meeting its obligations under the majority of its CDS agreements,” leading to “a run on its collateral
by its derivative counterparties and CDS protection buyers”); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe
Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319, 320 (2010) (describing the AIG collapse as a “downward
spiral”). At least some of those “investors” may not actually have owned MBS; instead, they directly
or indirectly purchased protection under CDS contracts whose payments tied to MBS pricing.
31 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Joe Valenti, Commentary: How the CFPB Fight Is a Sign of the Next Financial
Crisis, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/06/cfpb-director-mick-mulvaney-leandra-english
[https://perma.cc/V6UG-L25Y] (referring to AIG as the “poster child of the financial crisis”).
32 See Lubben, supra note 30, at 320. Ironically, the safe harbor provisions of U.S. bankruptcy
law appear to have exacerbated AIG’s position by allowing counterparty suits to go forward
notwithstanding the automatic stay, which suspends all litigation against an entity that has ﬁled for
bankruptcy. Id. These provisions give derivatives-contract counterparties “virtually unlimited
enforcement rights against [a counterparty] debtor.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral:
Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 700. This deprives a systemically
important counterparty debtor of bankruptcy law’s protections, including the automatic stay,
“thereby hastening [its] collapse.” Id. at 707. For that reason, I have argued that “the safe harbor’s
application should be limited to remedies pursued by SIFIs against non-SIFIs.” See id. at 712, 718
(using the term “SIFI,” as is common, to refer to a systemically important ﬁnancial institution).
33 See Felix Salmon, Why AIG Wasn’t Allowed to Fail, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2009),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/03/17/why-aig-wasnt-allowed-to-fail [https://perma.cc/
N6DW-2GKP] (explaining that the government bailed out AIG as a result of the “systemic fragility
of the CDS market” in order to prevent “a cascade of counterparty failures which could kill the
entire ﬁnancial system”).
34 Letter from Warren E. Buﬀet, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 15 (Feb. 21, 2003) (available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
2002pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/L58B-PX84]). The media has also suggested that Lehman Brothers’
derivatives contracts were unusually systemically risky. See, e.g., Jeﬀrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic
Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2008, 12:01 AM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123050916770038267 (reporting that the early termination of
Lehman Brothers’ derivatives contracts is estimated to have cost the ﬁrm approximately ﬁfty billion
dollars). Ironically, as in AIG, this cost instead resulted from the safe harbor provisions of U.S.
bankruptcy law purporting to protect derivatives counterparties. Cf. Too Big to Fail: The Role for
Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 71-72 (2009) (statement of
Harvey R. Miller, Lead Counsel for Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP)
(testifying that Lehman’s lack of automatic stay protection in bankruptcy, due to those safe harbor
provisions, led to a state of confusion and chaos); Lubben, supra note 30, at 320 (observing that those
safe harbor provisions exacerbated AIG’s position by allowing counterparty suits to go forward
notwithstanding the automatic stay).
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In response, the Dodd-Frank Act—the Congressional legislation that seeks
to redress the excesses that led to the financial crisis35—and followup regulation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and CFTC require that
many derivatives contracts be centrally cleared through CCPs.36 In accord with
recommendations of the Financial Stability Board, an organization established
by the G20 nations to monitor and make recommendations about the global
financial system, numerous jurisdictions outside the United States have
similarly begun requiring central clearing of derivatives contracts.37 If AIG’s
CDS contracts were centrally cleared, the argument goes, it would not have
needed a government bailout.38
In the ﬁrst instance, the answer to this Article’s question—whether
regulators should also require nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts to be centrally
cleared—turns on understanding why derivatives contracts are systemically
risky. If derivatives contracts are inherently systemically riskier than
nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts, then centrally clearing nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts might only marginally reduce systemic risk. If, however,
derivatives contracts are systemically risky because of a trait they share with
nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts, then it could be valuable to extend central
clearing to nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts that share that trait.
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows. Part I examines the systemic
riskiness of financial contracts. It finds that derivatives contracts are not
inherently systemically risky; rather, their systemic riskiness derives from their
systemically important counterparties. Observing that nonderivative financial
contracts sometimes also have systemically important counterparties, Part I then
builds on that shared trait to derive a theory to explain when regulation should
require central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts. Part II develops the
theory by testing it against current regulation requiring the central clearing of
derivatives contracts. Part III examines the theory’s regulatory and economic
efficiency implications for determining whether to expand central clearing to

35 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
36 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth general requirements for derivatives,
subsequently expanded through SEC and CFTC regulation. See, e.g., Derivatives, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml [https://perma.cc/
6J52-XYRC] (last updated May 4, 2015).
37 See, e.g., RICHARD HECKINGER, IVANA RUFFINI & KIRSTIN WELLS, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF CHI., UNDERSTANDING DERIVATIVES: MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 32 (2014),
https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/understanding-derivatives/understanding-derivativeschapter-3-over-the-counter-derivatives-pdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/Z5DY-8YUF] (summarizing the
regulatory history of the central clearing mandate for derivatives contracts).
38 Cf. supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing AIG’s near failure). As this Article
will explain, however, that begs the question whether the CCP would have needed a government
bailout. See infra Part IV.
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nonderivative financial contracts. It also identifies and balances the benefits and
costs of such a regulatory expansion. Part IV examines how to limit the costs of
expansion, including by adapting the protections against CCP risk concentration
that currently apply to central clearing of derivatives contracts. It also examines
how to enhance those protections. Part V focuses in depth on two fundamental
legal questions raised by central clearing: whether regulators should mandate how
financial institutions control risk, and whether they should require financial
institutions to mutualize risk. Appendix 1 to this Article illustrates how
nonderivative financial contracts could be centrally cleared and compares that to
the central clearing of derivatives contracts. Finally, Appendix 2 explains how to
standardize nonderivative financial contracts, showing that such standardization
would be quite feasible because, among other reasons, nonderivative financial
contracts already are commonly documented on standardized forms.
I. EXAMINING THE SYSTEMIC RISKINESS OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
As discussed, regulators assume that derivatives contracts are inherently
systemically risky, suggesting that something about their nature creates that
risk. That assumption, however, has never been rigorously tested. Section I.A
examines the nature of derivatives contracts to explain their systemic
riskiness. Thereafter, Section I.B uses insights from that inquiry to explain
the potential systemic riskiness of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.
A. Explaining Why Derivatives Contracts Are Systemically Risky
There are almost no formal studies of the inherent systemic riskiness of
derivatives contracts,39 much less studies comparing the systemic riskiness of
derivatives and nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts. Most of the discussion has
been anecdotal. Some argue, for example, that derivatives contracts are
especially systemically risky because derivatives are bets.40 However, all
ﬁnancial contracts are bets. A loan agreement is a bet by a lender that the
borrower will repay the loan on a timely basis with interest. Even a simple
guarantee is a bet by the guarantor, in consideration of a guarantee fee, that
the guaranteed obligation will not default.
Others suggest that derivatives contracts are especially systemically risky
because derivatives are volatile: “[u]nlike other contracts, the value of
[derivatives contracts] typically can change rapidly based on the ﬂuctuating
39 Compare studies cited infra notes 57–58 (supporting this Article’s explanation of why derivatives
contracts are systemically risky), with Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex
Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 391 (2013) (discussing the inherent riskiness of credit-derivatives contracts,
a special type of derivatives contract).
40 Cf. supra note 25 and accompanying text (characterizing derivatives contracts as bets).
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value of the underlying assets or collateral, prevailing market conditions and
other factors.”41 Volatility in turn can create the possibility of indeterminate
liability. Consider, for example, an interest-rate swap in which Party A
exchanges its ﬁxed interest-rate payments for Party B’s ﬂoating rate payments
(based, for example, on LIBOR). If interest rates fall, Party B will take a loss
that cannot be precisely quantiﬁed ex ante because it will depend on the
magnitude of the interest-rate change.
Nonetheless, the parties usually can estimate the limits of their potential
liability.42 In the interest-rate swap example, there is indeterminate liability
insofar as the parties cannot know, when they enter into the derivatives
contract, the sign (positive or negative) and magnitude of the interest-rate
change. In reality, however, they will know from market experience and be able
to model the likely maximum range of any interest-rate change within the
timeframe of their contractual settlement date.43 Similarly, in the example of
Party A contracting to sell 1000 shares of XYZ stock to Party B a year hence at
$70 per share (its current market value),44 there is indeterminate liability insofar
as the parties cannot currently know the sign and magnitude of XYZ stock’s
change in market value. In reality, again, they will know from market
experience and be able to calculate the likely maximum range of any such
change within the next year.45 Furthermore, the derivatives contracts that some
have identified as the most dangerous type—credit derivatives46—actually have
fairly precisely known maximum liabilities: in the case of a CDS guaranteeing
repayment of a loan, for example, the maximum liability would be the principal
and interest accruing on the loan through the settlement date.47

41 Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; Treatment of
Derivatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 40 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP).
42 See René M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2004, at 173, 186
(observing that, “[s]ince 1994, regular users of derivatives have made considerable progress in measuring
the risks of derivatives portfolios [and w]ith these tools, firms that use derivatives regularly know their
risks reasonably well,” but cautioning that “these measurement tools do not always work well”).
43 See, e.g., PAUL G. FERRARA & SEYED ALI NEZZAMODDINI, INTEREST RATE SWAPS—AN
EXPOSURE ANALYSIS 26 (2013) (discussing how parties estimate their likely exposure to interest-rate
change within the timeframe of their contractual settlement date).
44 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
45 Cf. infra note 52 and accompanying text (observing that accountants have devised a range of
methodologies to estimate potential liability for even the most complex derivatives).
46 See Yadav, supra note 39, at 391; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining
credit derivatives).
47 Cf. PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC., PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 206
(2015), http://www3.prudential.com/annualreport/report2015/annual/images/Prudential-AR2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6TL-Y2NT] (“The Company’s maximum amount at risk under [its] credit
derivatives equals the aforementioned notional amounts [i.e., principal and interest on the underlying
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Although the foregoing interest-rate swap and CDS examples (which
reﬂect some of the most common types of derivatives contracts) are relatively
simple, parties usually can estimate the limits of their potential liability even
under much more complex derivatives. The disclosure of this liability is in
fact an accounting requirement. Government securities regulators48 have
delegated to the accounting profession49 the duty to disclose ﬁnancial
information—including information about the fair value of derivatives as
either assets or liabilities50—through formalized ﬁnancial statements, such as
balance sheets and income statements; the goal is to provide the “credib[ility],
transparen[cy], and comparab[ility]” needed for “the eﬃcient functioning of
the economy.”51 To facilitate that required disclosure about derivatives
liability, accountants have devised a range of methodologies to estimate
potential liability for even the most complex derivatives.52
obligations on which Prudential sold credit protection] and assumes the value of the underlying
referenced securities [i.e., their principal and interest payable thereunder] become [sic] worthless.”).
48 In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320, 346-47 (2002) (discussing the SEC’s delegation of
disclosure power to the accounting profession).
49 In the United States, to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB. Id.
50 In the United States, this is governed by Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 133,
which “establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments” and “requires that
an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of ﬁnancial position
and measure those instruments at fair value.” See Summary of Statement No. 133: Accounting for
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (Issued 6/98), FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum133.shtml [https://perma.cc/ME5H-HCVQ]. FAS 133 has
been amended by FAS 161, which requires even further enhanced derivatives disclosure. See Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 161: Disclosures About Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities,
FIN. ACCT. SERIES (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Norwalk, Conn.), Mar. 2008, at 1.
51 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB 1 (2007), https://www.fasb.org/
cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818791156&
blobheader=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/4AX6-TZ7W].
52 See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENT FOR DERIVATIVES
CONTRACTS 5-6 (2014), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-credit-valuation-adjustmentsfor-derivative-contracts/$FILE/EY-Applying-FV-April-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8CK-LQSH].
This publication discusses various approaches for calculating valuation adjustments to value
derivatives contracts fairly—fair value meaning in this context, as deﬁned by International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 13, “the price that would be . . . paid to transfer a liability in an orderly
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.” IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement,
INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS, https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/
ifrs-13-fair-value-measurement [https://perma.cc/V63G-9T6L]. The Deloitte accounting ﬁrm
deﬁnes fair value under IFRS 13 more intuitively as “how much the reporting entity has to pay to a
market participant such that the market participant is willing to take over the liability.” DELOITTE
LLP, CLEARLY IFRS—SUMMARY GUIDANCE AND PRACTICAL TIPS FOR IFRS 13 – FAIR VALUE
MEASUREMENT 1 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/audit/
ca-en-audit-clearly-ifrs-fair-value-measurement-ifrs-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJC9-XUAK]. The “most
advanced approach” is the Expected Future Exposure (EFE) approach, which is used by banks and other
financial institutions with large derivative portfolios and can be “used for many types of derivatives.”
ERNST & YOUNG, supra, at 5-6. Because the EFE approach “can be very complex and . . . needs to be
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For these reasons, volatility alone does not make derivatives contracts
systemically riskier than nonderivative financial contracts. That leaves only
one other factor that can explain the systemic riskiness of derivatives contracts:
most such contracts have at least one large53 and highly interconnected54
financial institution as a counterparty. The three main determinants of
systemic risk are size, interconnectedness, and substitutability.55 Having a
large and highly interconnected financial institution as a counterparty
(hereinafter, a “systemically important counterparty”) causes derivatives
contracts to incorporate two of those three determinants of systemic risk.56
The little research examining why derivatives contracts are systemically
risky supports the view that their riskiness turns on the systemically
important nature of their counterparties. Economists at the New York Federal
Reserve Bank and ﬁnance scholars at Yale ﬁnd, for example, that derivatives
“create[] systemic risk” when the failure of a derivatives counterparty “could
seriously impair the ﬁnancial condition of one or more of its [systemically
important] counterparties.”57 No research appears to contradict that ﬁnding.58
executed by quantitative experts and requires access to significant IT systems,” many firms “have adopted
alternative approaches for estimating” liability on their derivatives contracts. Id.
53 Cf. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: What Role
Can the Bankruptcy Code Play? (ﬁnding that relatively few banks eﬀectively control the derivatives
market, and that seven U.S. banks hold more than ninety-ﬁve percent of the U.S. notional
derivatives exposure), in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES
347, 351 (Douglas D. Evanoﬀ & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005).
54 See, e.g., Christopher S. Dwight, Note, Missed (Inter)Connections: Proposed Revisions to the
Federal Reserve’s Approach to Financial Stability Analysis Under the Bank Holding Company Act, 18 N.C.
BANKING INST. 599, 603 (2014) (arguing that derivatives counterparties are highly interconnected
because they engage in multiple transactions with other systemically important ﬁrms).
55 See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 704.
56 Cf. James Bullard, President & Chief Executive Oﬃcer, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Systemic Risk and the Macroeconomy: An Attempt at Perspective (Oct. 2, 2008) (transcript
available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2008/
systemic-risk-and-the-macroeconomy-an-attempt-at-perspective [https://perma.cc/JDD3-RJBM])
(arguing that the failure of a large and highly interconnected counterparty can lead to a domino
eﬀect, setting oﬀ a pattern of failures among its counterparties). But cf. Rizwaan Jameel Mokal,
Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 15, 15-16 (2015) (arguing that counterparty failure may not be a signiﬁcant source of
systemic risk, and that the “domino contagion view of distress . . . is theoretically ﬂawed and
empirically false” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Professor Mokal contends that the premise
of the domino-eﬀect risk, that “a signiﬁcant market participant’s failure to meet its obligations would
result in similar failures by its counterparties,” is a “relic of the [ﬂawed] microprudential
understanding of systemic risk”; among other hurdles, he maintains, a domino-eﬀect collapse would
require an implausibly large initial failure. Id. at 19.
57 ROSALIND Z. WIGGINS & ANDREW METRICK, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., THE LEHMAN
BROTHERS BANKRUPTCY G: THE SPECIAL CASE OF DERIVATIVES 15-16 (2014) (quoting with
approval a New York Federal Reserve study).
58 Although one study suggests that the “complexity and limited transparency of the [over-the-counter
derivatives] market reinforced the potential for excessive risk-taking” and thus counterparty failure. See
DARRELL DUFFIE, ADA LI & THEO LUBKE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 424,
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B. Explaining Why Nonderivative Financial Contracts
Could Be Systemically Risky
The insight that the systemic riskiness of derivatives contracts turns on the
nature of their counterparties, not on their inherent nature, indicates that
nonderivative financial contracts with systemically important counterparties
could also be systemically risky.59 That presumes, of course, that the
systemically important counterparty is exposed to counterparty risk.60 That
presumption should be valid because virtually all financial contracts—whether
derivatives or nonderivatives—create counterparty risk, which results from the
performance of obligations over time.61 Financial contracts depend on future
performance.62 Even the simplest loan agreement, for example, depends on
the borrower being able to repay principal and interest in the future.63
Indeed, much of the financial institution counterparty risk that triggered the
financial crisis arose under nonderivative financial contracts. Although some
identify Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy as a cause of the financial crisis,64
Lehman’s counterparty risk first arose under MBS contracts, which are
nonderivative financial contracts.65 Lehman’s counterparties began demanding
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2010) (suggesting that
excessive risk taking by financial firms has a wide range of causes); infra note 145 and accompanying text.
Moreover, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts are not always centrally cleared.
59 Incongruously, the Dodd-Frank requirement to centrally clear derivatives contracts through
CCPs applies whether or not a derivatives contract has any systemically important counterparties.
60 Cf. NORMAN, supra note 6, at 7 (deﬁning counterparty risk); supra note 8 and accompanying
text (same).
61 Cf. Law and Finance Workshop, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., https://www.chicagofed.org/
events/2014/law-ﬁnance-workshop [https://perma.cc/ZGN8-TSUA] (last updated June 10, 2014)
(stating that it “is the performance of obligations over time . . . which introduces the liquidity and
counterparty credit risks at the heart of the contemporary policy debate surrounding the regulation
of [derivatives] markets”).
62 The exceptions are very limited, such as a “spot” contract, a subset of derivatives contracts in
which the contract performance is immediate—such as a traveler exchanging U.S. dollars for euros at an
airport at the then-posted exchange rate. See, e.g., Spot Contracts – What Are They?, TRADE FIN. GLOB.,
https://www.tradeﬁnanceglobal.com/currency/spot-contracts [https://perma.cc/L2BG-CPDY].
63 See supra text following note 40. One reviewer of this Article asked whether the fact that
nonderivative financial contracts create “one-sided counterparty credit risk, while most derivatives
present two-sided risk” might make derivatives contracts systemically riskier. It should not for at least
two reasons. First, relatively more counterparties to derivatives contracts are systemically important,
see infra note 75, so the likelihood any counterparty defaults is less than for nonsystemically important
counterparties. Second, nonderivative financial contracts also effectively have two-sided risk. This
Article focuses on the risk that a counterparty borrower defaults in repaying a systemically important
counterparty lender, causing it to fail; but the counterparty borrower also bears the risk that its
financial condition will deteriorate during the loan term, causing it to default.
64 See, e.g., Viral Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies, 18 FIN.
MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 89, 93 (2009) (stating that Lehman’s bankruptcy “led to
the near collapse of the ﬁnancial system”).
65 MBS are promissory notes backed by interests in mortgage loans. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 2011) (stating that “mortgage loans are pooled together in
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collateral out of concern that the collapse of the MBS market was causing
Lehman’s large MBS investments to become worthless.66 Although Lehman
filed for bankruptcy protection in response to those demands, the problems with
Lehman’s derivatives contracts arose only once Lehman went into bankruptcy.67
Similarly, although the move to require central clearing of derivatives
contracts assumes those contracts were a cause of the ﬁnancial crisis,68
derivatives-contract problems were more of an eﬀect than a cause. CDS
investors commenced collection actions against AIG because of the collapse
of the MBS market.69 They would not have done so absent that collapse
because AIG would have been able to pay its liability on the CDS.
Observers also identify the failure of the repo market as a cause of the
ﬁnancial crisis.70 Repos are nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts—short-term
secured loans couched as sales and repurchases of securities that serve as the
collateral for the loan,71 not unlike a conditional sale agreement.72 Because the
amount of the repo market is huge, scholars are beginning to argue for the
central clearing of repo transactions.73
Informed by these observations, this Article’s question can be restated
more precisely: should regulators require nonderivative financial contracts that
have at least one systemically important counterparty to be centrally cleared in order

a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities, the underlying promissory notes serve as
ﬁnancial instruments generating a potential income stream for investors”). Normally, derivatives
have nothing to do with MBS. See, e.g., FIRST EMPIRE SEC., MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 4,
http://www.1empire.com/Forms/MBS.pdf [https://perma.cc/63SV-M8FR] (stating that “it is
important to understand the MBSs are not mortgage derivative investments”).
66 See Laurence Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary 7-8 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22410, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22410
[https://perma.cc/VCA6-AZS7] (observing that collateral calls by counterparties, including
demands for collateral from JP Morgan Chase, the clearing bank for Lehman’s tri-party repos,
contributed to Lehman’s collapse); cf. infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing how the fear
of counterparty risk could lead to a systemically important ﬁrm’s failure).
67 Cf. McCracken, supra note 34 (explaining why Lehman’s derivatives problems resulted from
its bankruptcy).
68 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
69 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J.
FIN. ECON. 425, 425 (2012).
71 See, e.g., 1. What Is a Repo?, INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, https://www.icmagroup.org/
Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/icma-ercc-publications/frequentlyasked-questions-on-repo/1-what-is-a-repo [https://perma.cc/VHQ7-U4UY].
72 See U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (observing that the
“retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods [i.e., a conditional sale agreement] is limited in
eﬀect to a reservation of a ‘security interest’”).
73 See, e.g., Paolo Saguato, The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A Two-Step Policy Option
to Address the Regulatory Void, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 126 (2017) (arguing that CCPs should
be used to reduce risk in the repo markets). Repo dealers already voluntarily engage in a form of
central clearing. See infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
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to reduce systemic risk?74 Consistent with this restatement, further references
in this Article to nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts shall mean only such
contracts that have at least one systemically important counterparty.75
The restated question can also be reformulated as an initial theory76: to
reduce systemic risk, regulators should require central clearing of
nonderivative financial contracts that have at least one systemically important
counterparty. That theory is incomplete, however, because financial regulation
is justified only if its benefits exceed its costs.77 Although requiring central
clearing of nonderivative financial contracts will create benefits by reducing
systemic risk resulting from individual counterparty risk, it can also create
costs, notably the transaction costs of creating and operating the CCPs and

74 This Article does not need to diﬀerentiate at the outset whether the systemically important
counterparty is an obligor or an obligee. Using the preceding example of a loan agreement, see supra
notes 21–22 and accompanying text, if the systemically important counterparty is a lender (an
obligee), the failure of the borrower (an obligor) to repay the loan may cause the lender’s failure;
whereas if the systemically important counterparty is a borrower (an obligor), its repayment
exposure might cause its failure especially if that exposure is aggregated on multiple loans—such as
might occur for a highly leveraged ﬁrm. Cf. supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing AIG’s
precrisis aggregated counterparty exposure on CDS contracts).
75 Because derivatives markets are relatively concentrated, see Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 706,
a derivatives contract may be more likely than a nonderivative ﬁnancial contract to have not just one
but two systemically important counterparties. If systemic riskiness were to turn on the contract
having at least two systemically important counterparties, this Article’s analysis of expanding central
clearing to nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts should be limited to ﬁnancial contracts that have at least
two such counterparties. Analytically though, a ﬁnancial contract that has just one systemically
important counterparty can be systemically risky. Indeed, a ﬁnancial contract that has two parties,
both of whom are systemically important, may be less systemically risky than a ﬁnancial contract
that has just one systemically important counterparty. Both parties to the former contract, being
systemically important, would be legally required to maintain capital and other protections that
minimize their likely failure. Therefore, neither would likely default under the contract. The
nonsystemically important counterparty to the latter contract would thus be more likely to default,
which could destabilize that contract’s systemically important counterparty.
76 Again, this Article uses the term “theory” in its fundamental meaning as a set of ideas that
help to explain something. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (quoting the Oxford American
Dictionary’s deﬁnition of theory as “a set of ideas formulated (by reasoning from known facts) to
explain something”).
77 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S1, S3 (2014) (arguing that ﬁnancial regulation should be subject to
cost-beneﬁt analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE
L.J.F. 263, 263 (2015) (explaining that “[c]ost-beneﬁt analysis is best understood as a way for agencies
to ensure that their decisions are informed”); cf. Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (deﬁning cost–beneﬁt analysis as “[a]n analytical technique that weighs the costs of
a proposed decision”); Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael
Sheppard ed., Wolters Kluwer Compact ed. 2011) (observing that federal agency cost–beneﬁt
analysis for determining whether a new regulation is promulgated “must demonstrate that the
beneﬁts to society outweigh the costs that the regulation will impose”).
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the possible systemic costs of concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.78
A complete theory should take into account those benefits and costs.79
To help develop this theory, this Article next tests it against current
regulation requiring the central clearing of derivatives contracts.
II. CENTRAL CLEARING OF DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS
As discussed, the United States and many other nations now require
counterparties to centrally clear most of their derivatives contracts through
CCPs.80 In principle, this makes sense as a way to reduce systemic risk if, as
is often the case, the derivatives contract has at least one systemically
important counterparty.81 Counterparty risk that causes the failure—or even
the fear of failure—of systemically important counterparties can trigger
78 See, e.g., VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA, OCEAN DALTON & STATHIS TOMPAIDIS, OFFICE OF
FIN. RESEARCH, BRIEF SERIES NO. 17-04, BENEFITS AND RISKS OF CENTRAL CLEARING IN THE
REPO MARKET 1-5 (2017) (discussing those costs); cf. Ivana Ruﬃni, Central Clearing: Risks and
Customer Protections, 39 ECON. PERSP. 90, 97 (2015) (observing that central clearing creates systemic
costs by concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs); infra note 91 and accompanying text (same).
79 Compare infra note 86 and accompanying text (observing the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate that
reducing systemic risk is so urgent that regulation reducing that risk should not be conditioned on a
cost–benefit analysis), with PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, THE IMPORTANCE OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 2 (2013), https://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CBA-Report-3.10.131.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYM9-JH7S] (arguing, in
response to the failure to adequately conduct cost–beneﬁt analysis in ﬁnancial regulation pursuant
to the Dodd-Frank Act, that the history and policies that motivate the use of cost–beneﬁt analysis
“generally apply with equal (if not greater) force in the financial regulation context” and that
“[f]inancial regulators, especially in the context of Dodd-Frank, can and should ground their
rulemaking in robust cost-benefit analysis in order to arrive at more rational decision-making and
efficient regulatory action as well as to promote good governance and democratic accountability”).
This Article’s analysis is normative, so it does not purport to rely on the Dodd-Frank Act’s aforesaid
mandate. Moreover, federal regulators’ decision to backtrack on designating insurer MetLife as a
SIFI—after initially imposing that designation under the authority of the Dodd-Frank Act—mounted
an implied challenge to that law’s mandate. See, e.g., John Heltman, FSOC Gives Up Effort to Designate
MetLife as SIFI, AM. BANKER (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:45 PM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/fsoc-gives-up-eﬀort-to-designate-metlife-as-siﬁ.
80 See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text (explaining also that this central clearing
requirement is largely a response to the ﬁnancial crisis, in which counterparty risk in derivatives
contracts played out in dramatic fashion).
81 Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 452-53
(2013). CCPs may also add value as central information aggregators. Cf. R.A. Washington, Derivatives: What
Is a Clearinghouse?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/04/
derivatives [https://perma.cc/A6VU-ZZTN] (explaining that “[c]learinghouses also centralize trade
reporting, and can provide any level of post-trade transparency to the OTC derivatives markets that your
heart desires—same-day trade reporting, including prices, aggregate and counterparty-level position data,
etc.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Economics of Contempt, Exchanges vs. Clearinghouses (This
is Important), ECON. OF CONTEMPT (Apr. 14, 2010, 4:36 PM), http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/
2010/04/exchanges-vs-clearinghouses-this-is.html [https://perma.cc/W8ZN-Z5SY])). This role arguably
gives CCPs the capacity to create derivatives markets that are less opaque than traditional over-the-counter
derivatives markets. Levitin, supra, at 451-52.
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systemic risk.82 By protecting systemically important counterparties from
counterparty risk, central clearing can remove that trigger.83
As indicated, however, financial regulation is justified only if its benefits
exceed its costs.84 The current regulation requiring the central clearing of
derivatives contracts does not appear to be justified by any formal cost–benefit
analyses.85 At least in the United States, that may well reflect the Dodd-Frank
Act’s mandate that reducing systemic risk is so important that regulation reducing
that risk should not be conditioned on a traditional cost–benefit analysis.86
82 Cf. DUFFIE, LI & LUBKE, supra note 58, at 5 (observing that “[s]ystemic risk also arises
when the fear of . . . failure could lead counterparties to attempt to avoid potential losses by reducing
their exposures to a large, weak market participant, possibly contributing to a ‘run’ that indeed
accelerates the failure of that market participant”); supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing
how fear of contracting with Lehman Brothers similarly led to its failure).
83 Absent central counterparty clearing, for example, a concentration of counterparty exposure
on a CDS protection seller (for an explanation of CDS protection, see supra note 29 and accompanying
text) could cause the seller’s failure. If the protection seller is systemically important, its failure in turn
could potentially trigger a broader systemic economic collapse. The protection seller’s failure could
cause that collapse not merely by virtue of its inability to pay its general obligations but also by virtue
of its inability to pay its guarantee obligations on the CDS contracts. This was the very fear that
prompted the government to bail out AIG, the protection seller on multiple CDS contracts
guaranteeing repayment on mortgage-backed securities. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
85 In its “primer” discussing central clearing of OTC derivatives, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) merely stated without formal cost–benefit analysis that “ultimately the benefits of systemic risk
reduction from moving OTC derivatives to a CCP very likely outweigh the costs in the longer run.”
IMF, Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System—Making Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Safer: The Role of Central Counterparties 26, Global Financial Stability Report (Apr. 2010). When the
European Commission mandated central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives by amending the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), it pointed to “commitment[s]” by G20 leaders in
2009 and 2010 to centrally clear these derivatives; but no cost–benefit analysis appears to have justified
those commitments. See Council Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (EU). But cf. Questions and
Answers on the Proposal to Amend the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), EUROPEAN
COMM’N (June 13, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1583_en.htm [https://perma.cc/
9ER6-4AUC] (noting that the European Commission “is making its proposal [to require standardized
OTC derivatives contracts to be cleared through a CCP] based on feedback that builds on an extensive
assessment of EMIR and two public consultations” and that “[t]he main beneficiaries of this proposal
are citizens and the economy as a whole through a safer financial system where the probability of the
failure of a CCP and the contagion to the broader financial system is further reduced,” thereby suggesting
but not confirming the use of cost–benefit analysis).
86 The Federal Reserve Board, for example, interprets the Dodd-Frank Act as directing the
Federal Reserve, when regulating to mitigate risks to the ﬁnancial stability of the country, to bypass
consideration of costs and beneﬁts. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
CALIBRATING THE GSIB SURCHARGE 13 (2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/
boardmeetings/gsib-methodology-paper-20150720.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K5B-LX6A] (stating that
“cost-beneﬁt analysis was not chosen as the primary calibration framework for the GSIB surcharge
for two reasons [of which the ﬁrst is that] it is not directly related to the mandate provided by the
Dodd-Frank Act, which instructs the Board to mitigate risks to the ﬁnancial stability of the United
States”); cf. Posner & Weyl, supra note 77, at S3 (observing that because U.S. ﬁnancial regulatory
agencies are so-called independent agencies, they have not regarded themselves as bound by
executive orders requiring the use of cost–beneﬁt analysis). Professors Posner and Weyl also discuss
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Implicitly, however, regulators have made certain cost–benefit judgments.
The costs of central clearing include the transaction costs of creating and
operating the CCPs and also, ironically, systemic costs resulting from
concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.87 Some scholars argue that
requiring central clearing does not even reduce but merely shifts
counterparty—and thus systemic—risk from individual counterparties to the
CCPs.88 Regulators have partly limited the transaction costs by restricting the
central clearing requirement to standardized derivatives contracts.89 They also
recognize the systemic costs.90 One Federal Reserve expert warns that the
“concentration of risk in CCPs must not be underestimated, as CCP failures,
while rare, do happen.”91 Regulators nonetheless appear to believe, without
actually testing, that requiring central clearing of derivatives contracts reduces
overall systemic risk notwithstanding CCP counterparty-risk concentration.92 At
the importance of reducing systemic risk given that historical data suggest the cost of a systemic
crisis can be as high as twenty percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Eric Posner & E. Glen
Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 394 (2013).
87 To a lesser extent, central clearing can also create costs that arguably are systemic by
imposing increased and more rigorous margin requirements, which can create signiﬁcant liquidity
funding needs. Diana Milanesi, Risk/Beneﬁt Analysis of Central Clearing of Over-the-Counter
(OTC) Derivatives and a Chaos Theory-Based Perspective on Clearing Mandates 197 (Summer
2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (available at
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt8nz4n9z9/qt8nz4n9z9.pdf?t=p2rjix); see also
CRAIG PIRRONG, CATO INST., THE INEFFICIENCY OF CLEARING MANDATES 3 (2010),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CEZ-UDKH]
(“Clearinghouses can control moral hazard by imposing margin requirements and limits on the
amount of insurance provided. Since collateral is socially costly, however, it is socially costly to
control moral hazard this way.”). To mitigate these costs, CCPs now accept a wide range of assets as
collateral, subject to appropriate haircuts and, sometimes, hard dollar limits for each class of assets.
See, e.g., Financial and Collateral Management, CME GRP., https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/
financial-and-collateral-management.html [https://perma.cc/A7PS-R3QN] (indicating this CCP
“accept[s] a diverse portfolio of assets as collateral” subject to those limitations); cf. Derivatives Clearing
Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,346, 69,349-50 (Nov. 8,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140) (giving CCPs discretion to choose among a wide
range of assets to use as margin, provided they apply an appropriate haircut depending on risk).
88 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (explaining why restricting central clearing to
standardized ﬁnancial contracts should reduce transaction costs).
90 See, e.g., Benoît Coeuré, Member, Executive Bd. of the European Central Bank, Lecture at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2015 Symposium on Central Clearing: Ensuring an Adequate
Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Central Counterparties (Apr. 10, 2015) (transcript available at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150411.en.html [https://perma.cc/DW2R-8NTU]);
Jerome H. Powell, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Symposium on Central Clearing: Central Clearing and Liquidity (June
23, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/
powell20170623a.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH3J-25BD]).
91 Ruﬃni, supra note 78, at 97.
92 See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the SEC Open
Meeting (Dec. 15, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch121510mls-1.htm
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least in the United States, that belief may be based in part on the Dodd-Frank
Act’s protection of certain CCPs as financial market utilities.93
This Article does not engage the debate on whether requiring central
clearing of derivatives contracts reduces, or merely shifts, overall systemic
risk. The widespread reality of that central clearing requirement indicates
that it may well reduce overall systemic risk. This Article builds on that
reality to analyze whether regulators should also require central clearing of
nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts. This approach follows the strong scholarly
precedent for grafting a normative legal inquiry onto positive-law reality.94
In other words, this Article does not necessarily agree on the merits of the
positive-law reality; it merely uses it as an analytical starting point.
As informed by this Part II, this Article’s theory can be further restated
as follows: To reduce systemic risk, regulation should require central clearing
of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts that have at least one systemically
important counterparty if the beneﬁts of that clearing exceed its costs. To
reduce costs, the regulation should (as with central clearing of derivatives
contracts) restrict that central clearing to standardized ﬁnancial contracts and
protect the central-clearing CCPs against the systemic costs of concentrated
counterparty risk. Pragmatically, central clearing should be further limited to
only “material” contracts that have a minimum potential payment
obligation.95 Appendix 1 of this Article illustrates how such nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts could be centrally cleared. It also compares that to the
central clearing of derivatives contracts. Appendix 2 of this Article explains
how to standardize nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.
Part III next examines the regulatory and economic eﬃciency
implications of the restated theory.

[https://perma.cc/DRY9-P34E]) (“When structured and operated appropriately, clearing agencies provide
important benefits like improving the management of counterparty risk [resulting from derivatives] and
reducing outstanding exposures through multilateral netting of trades. Through these actions, the ‘clearing’
process can help to reduce risks to the financial system overall.”).
93 See infra Section IV.A.
94 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775, 776-77 (1988) (grafting a normative analysis of bankruptcy law (what should be the best
method for dividing the corporate reorganization pie) onto a positive assumption about that law
(taking as given the widespread use of the corporate reorganization alternative to liquidation)).
95 The minimum should be based on the amount of defaulted payment that could reasonably
destabilize a systemically important counterparty. Although setting the minimum would be a
regulatory judgment, the author anticipates it would exceed, and might far exceed, ten million dollars.

2019]

Central Clearing of Financial Contracts

1347

III. CENTRAL CLEARING OF NONDERIVATIVE
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
Reducing systemic risk is an important regulatory goal.96 Central clearing of
nonderivative financial contracts can, in principle, significantly reduce that risk.97
Therefore, regulation should require that central clearing98 if the sum of its
anticipated benefits outweighs, or otherwise justifies, the sum of its anticipated
costs.99 This cost–benefit balancing also follows Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the
practical standard used by economists to assess the economic desirability of a
project.100 A project is Kaldor–Hicks efficient if its overall benefits exceed its
overall costs, regardless of who bears the costs and who gets the benefits.101
Section III.A next estimates the anticipated beneﬁts, and Section III.B
then estimates the anticipated costs, of centrally clearing nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts. Section III.C thereafter balances those beneﬁts and costs.
Per the restated theory, these estimates of beneﬁts and costs are restricted to
central clearing of standardized material nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts
that have at least one systemically important counterparty. The estimates also
assume that CCPs used for that central clearing will be protected against
concentrated counterparty risk the same way that CCPs used for central
clearing of derivatives contracts are protected.
This Article does not, however, attempt to quantify all of the benefits and costs
of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts. Instead, its cost–beneﬁt
balancing starts by taking as given that the benefits of centrally clearing derivatives

96 Cf. supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (observing the regulatory importance of
reducing systemic risk).
97 Parts I and II of this Article have shown that nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts can be
systemically risky, that the aggregate net counterparty exposure on those contracts greatly exceeds
that on derivatives contracts, and that central clearing of those contracts can reduce systemic risk
the same way that it reduces systemic risk for derivatives contracts.
98 This logic follows a consequence-based-inquiry (CBI) normative framework to determine when
financial market changes should drive legal changes. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to
Address Changing Markets: A Consequence-Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017, at 163.
99 See supra note 77; cf. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41974, COST-BENEFIT
AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (2014) (observing that a
“proposed regulatory requirement is judged to pass the ‘cost-benefit test’ if the sum of its anticipated
benefits outweighs, or otherwise justifies, the sum of its present and future costs in present value
terms” and explaining that “[c]ost-benefit analysis, in [the federal rulemaking] context, involves the
systematic identification of all of the costs and benefits associated with a forthcoming regulation”);
WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 187 (6th ed. 2012) (stating that each of
“the different processes of analysis that sometimes fit[s] under the general umbrella of cost-benefit
analysis . . . is an attempt to . . . get as much information and insight on a proposed government action
as possible” (emphasis added)).
100 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET
CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 190 (2004).
101 Id.
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contracts exceeds its costs.102 From that starting point, the cost–benefit balancing
of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts turns on how those
benefits and costs vary from those of central clearing derivatives contracts. If,
for example, the benefits of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts
are at least—and the costs of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts
do not exceed—the respective benefits and costs of centrally clearing
derivatives contracts, then central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts
should satisfy a cost–benefit balancing.
A. Estimating the Benefits of Centrally Clearing
Nonderivative Financial Contracts
The primary benefit of centrally clearing nonderivative financial
contracts—just like that of centrally clearing derivatives contracts—would be
the reduction of systemic risk at the level of individual systemically important
counterparties.103 Although the benefit of that risk reduction has not been
estimated for centrally clearing derivatives contracts, it is almost certainly huge.
The cost of the financial crisis has been estimated as exceeding twenty-two
trillion dollars.104 If it reduces the risk of another financial collapse by even ten
percent, centrally clearing derivatives contracts could save hundreds of billions
of dollars, if not more.
Centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts could reduce systemic
risk by an amount roughly comparable to (and possibly more than) the
reduction achieved by centrally clearing derivatives contracts. As previously
explained, the aggregate counterparty exposure on nonderivative ﬁnancial
contracts greatly exceeds that on derivatives contracts.105 The aggregate
102 Cf. supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text (observing that regulators assume, without
actually testing, that central clearing of derivatives contracts reduces overall systemic costs, and
stating that because central clearing of derivatives contracts is so widespread, this Article takes that
regulatory assumption as a starting point for analysis).
103 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. This cost–benefit analysis does not attempt to
predict possible ways in which innovative new technologies, such as blockchain and distributed ledger
technology (DLT), might change bilateral clearing of financial contracts to reduce systemic risk.
Diana Milanesi has been considering such possibilities and whether new technologies might
ultimately replace or supplement the need for central clearing. See Milanesi, supra note 87, at 164-65.
104 Eleazar David Melendez, Financial Crisis Cost Tops $22 Trillion, GAO Says, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 14, 2013, 7:49 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/financial-crisis-cost-gao_n_
2687553.html [https://perma.cc/GE7K-RXXF]; cf. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE
MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL 60 (2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/
media/files/publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/the-minneapolis-plan-to-end-toobig-to-fail-final.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/829M-EJ68] (observing that as a result of the ﬁnancial
crisis, “trillions of dollars in American wealth was destroyed”).
105 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. The news media sometimes incorrectly suggest
that the opposite is true, referencing the “notional amount” of derivatives outstanding globally (which
is almost ten times as large as world GDP). See, e.g., $700 Trillion in Global OTC Derivatives? Behind
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counterparty exposure on the set of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts on
which this Article focuses (those with systemically important counterparties
and that are standardized106) might, or might not, also exceed the aggregate
counterparty exposure on the set of derivatives contracts that are required to
be centrally cleared (those that are standardized).107 Assume, conservatively,
that the exposures are merely comparable. Because those nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts can be as systemically risky as derivatives contracts, central
clearing of those contracts should reduce systemic costs by an order of
magnitude corresponding to the hundreds-of-billions-of-dollars cost
reduction achieved by centrally clearing derivatives contracts.108
The foregoing comparison of systemic cost reduction implicitly presumes
that central clearing would reduce systemic risk for nonderivative ﬁnancial
contracts as eﬀectively as it would reduce systemic risk for derivatives
contracts. Some might argue, however, that central clearing would reduce
systemic risk more eﬀectively for derivatives contracts, which are more
susceptible to multilateral netting.109 Multilateral netting refers to a CCP’s
ability to net oﬀsetting payment obligations among its clearing members110:
“Multilateral netting allows for the aggregate oﬀset of positions and the
termination of economically redundant obligations. Multilateral netting
oﬀsets obligations [among] multiple parties as opposed to bilateral netting,
which oﬀsets obligations between only two counterparties.”111

the Number, MILKEN INST.: BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/blog/view/580
[https://perma.cc/QF87-DP4P] (discussing the news media’s mistaken reliance on notional amount
to measure the size of the derivatives market). The notional amount does not reﬂect the amount at
risk on a derivative; it merely refers to the value of underlying assets specified in the derivatives contract.
See, e.g., APANARD PRABHA, KEITH SAVARD & HEATHER WICKRAMARACHI, MILKEN INST.,
DERIVING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DERIVATIVES 27 (2014), http://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/
assets/Publication/ResearchReport/PDF/Derivatives-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CKQ-ANDS ]
(“[N]otional amounts outstanding, though a rough measure of derivatives activity, do not represent
. . . generally, the amount at risk.” (citations omitted)). The more appropriate measure of risk
exposure—which this Article uses as a basis for comparison—is gross market value. See MONETARY
& ECON. DEP’T, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that “gross market value represents the maximum
loss that market participants would incur if all counterparties failed to meet their contractual
payments and the contracts could be replaced at current market prices”).
106 See supra text following note 101.
107 See supra Section I.B.
108 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text; cf. BAKLANOVA, DALTON & TOMPAIDIS,
supra note 78, at 6 (estimating the beneﬁts of expanding the central clearing of repo transactions
beyond dealers as including—merely for that one type of nonderivative ﬁnancial contract—a $53.7
billion reduction in net exposure).
109 Two reviewers of this Article made that argument.
110 For an explanation of CCP clearing members and their responsibilities, see infra notes 162–67
and accompanying text.
111 Ruﬃni, supra note 78, at 91 (emphasis omitted).
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The distinction between bilateral and multilateral netting arises from
basic setoﬀ law. Parties generally have the right to set oﬀ, or “net,” mutually
oﬀsetting matured obligations.112 For example, if Party A owes $1,000,000 to
Party B and Party B owes $250,000 to Party A, then Party A owes only
$750,000 to Party B on a net basis after setoﬀ.113 Bilateral setoﬀ refers to this
type of ordinary setoﬀ between two parties.
In contrast, multilateral netting refers to setoff among multiple parties.
Setoff law does not normally permit multilateral netting because setoff rights
require precise mutuality of obligations.114 Central clearing, however, creates the
equivalent of mutuality by virtue of novation—in which the CCP legally
substitutes its credit for that of the contracting parties, making it the primary
counterparty on both sides of the contract.115 Thus, if clearing member A owes
clearing member B $1,000,000 and clearing member B owes clearing member C
$1,000,000, clearing member B’s offsetting obligations will be set off (i.e., netted)
and clearing member A will simply owe clearing member C the $1,000,000.
The argument that central clearing would reduce systemic risk more
effectively for derivatives contracts than for nonderivative financial contracts
depends, in the first instance, on the former being more susceptible to multilateral
netting.116 Derivatives contracts are indeed likely to be more susceptible to
multilateral netting because relatively more counterparties on derivatives
contracts would be CCP clearing members.117 That reflects the current reality that
derivatives-contract counterparties tend to be highly concentrated.118
Ultimately, however, the argument that central clearing would reduce
systemic risk more effectively for derivatives contracts than for nonderivative
financial contracts assumes that multilateral netting reduces systemic risk.119 The

112 Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problems with Setoﬀ: A Proposed Legislative Solution, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 51, 54 (1988).
113 Used as a noun, the term is a “setoﬀ ”; used as a verb, the expression is to “set oﬀ.”
114 See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of setoff . . . allows
entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the
absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S.
523, 528 (1913))); Mintz v. Tri-County Nat. Gas Co., 103 A. 285, 286 (Pa. 1918) (“Mutuality of debts
is the essential circumstance of a set-oﬀ.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
115 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
118 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 706 (discussing the concentration of derivatives markets).
Most of the Options Clearing Corporation’s clearing members, for example, are well-known financial
institutions like Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., Wells Fargo Securities, LLC,
and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. See OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 47
(2017), https://www.theocc.com/components/docs/about/annual-reports/occ-2016-annual-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KK2Q-VBGR].
119 Cf. IMF, supra note 85, at 6 (stating that “[m]ultilateral compression and tear-up operations
eliminate redundant contracts and reduce counterparty risk, and shorten and simplify systemic
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accuracy of that assumption has not been rigorously tested. Some question that
assumption, arguing that while multilateral netting can reduce credit risk, it can
increase systemic risk.120 Professor Mokal further contends that multilateral
netting encourages greater leverage and thus greater risk, redistributes risk
rather than diminishes it, weakens lending standards by worsening financial
agency and adverse selection costs, increases market volatility because net
exposures are vulnerable to movements that are multiples of the changes in the
underlying obligations, and spreads the effects of a systemic shock.121 For the
reasons discussed in Appendix 1, the author also personally questions whether
multilateral netting reduces systemic risk.122
This Article does not attempt, however to deﬁnitively resolve whether
multilateral netting reduces systemic risk.123 If multilateral netting does not
reduce that risk, the beneﬁts of centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial
contracts would closely resemble the beneﬁts of centrally clearing derivatives
contracts. Central clearing of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts would then
more clearly satisfy a cost–beneﬁt balancing.
Centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts could also provide benefits
beyond reducing systemic risk. For example,124 it could reduce transaction costs
by enabling CCPs to net offsetting contractual obligations, thereby more
efficiently managing counterparty risk.125 It could also provide an indirect political
benefit: by shifting counterparty risk from numerous systemically important
counterparties to a limited number of CCPs, it would facilitate the so-called

interconnections”); Ruffini, supra note 78, at 91 (stating that “multilateral netting of obligations[] often
result[s] in a reduction of counterparty credit risk and the liquidity risk borne by” clearing members).
120 See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK
NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 7 (1990),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d04.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CSN-26KM].
121 Mokal, supra note 56, at 19, 60-62.
122 See infra Appendix 1.
123 Multilateral netting more clearly increases CCP operational eﬃciencies. Cf. Froukelien
Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important to Fail Nature 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/15/21, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JW9E-XKL2] (observing that “multilateral netting . . . reduc[es] the total credit
exposure in the market as well as the number of transactions that need to be settled, which results
in operational eﬃciencies” (footnote omitted)).
124 Another possible beneﬁt of centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts is that it
might increase transparency. Cf. John Hull, OTC Derivatives and Central Clearing: Can All
Transactions Be Cleared?, FIN. STABILITY REV., July 2010, at 71, 76 (arguing that a beneﬁt of centrally
clearing nonstandard derivatives contracts would be increasing transparency).
125 See, e.g., Cyril Monnet, Let’s Make It Clear: How Central Counterparties Save(d) the Day, BUS.
REV., Q1 2010, at 1, 5 (“[T]he CCP works best if contracts are completely standardized . . . . [N]etting
is limited if contracts are only imperfectly substitutable.”); cf. Mokal, supra note 56, at 58-59 (observing
that netting allows CCP members to collateralize only their net rather than gross exposures (enabling
members to stretch collateral to cover a greater volume of transactions), enables a more efficient use of
regulatory capital, and enhances liquidity by allowing flexibility across legal categories and asset types).
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single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution strategy currently pursued by
regulators. This strategy is artificially dependent, among other things, on
government receivership and operation of a troubled systemically important
firm.126 Concentrating risk in CCPs could reduce the number of government
receiverships that are needed under that strategy—a benefit that could help to
offset the potential moral hazard cost of that risk concentration.127
B. Estimating the Costs of Centrally Clearing Nonderivative Financial Contracts
Although the beneﬁts of centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial
contracts could be huge, such clearing would generate at least two types of
costs: the transaction costs of creating and operating the CCPs, and the
possible systemic costs of concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.128
Consider each in turn.
1. Transaction Costs
The transaction costs of creating and operating CCPs for centrally clearing
nonderivative financial contracts would not appear to be very different from the
transaction costs of existing CCPs. An existing CCP whose clearing members
include the relevant counterparties could even clear both types of contracts.
A possible difference in operating costs might result from nonderivative
financial contracts being less standardized than derivative contracts.
Standardization reduces transaction costs because CCPs can much more easily
net offsetting obligations on standardized contracts than on nonstandardized
contracts.129 This cost differential might become insignificant, however,
because nonderivative financial contracts increasingly are being documented
on a standardized basis, like derivative contracts.130 Indeed, many
126 John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for Bailouts,
109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 107 (2014).
127 Cf. infra notes 145–53 and accompanying text (discussing the too big to fail problem).
128 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
129 To understand why, consider how netting works. Central clearing practice allows a CCP to net
offsetting obligations even if they are between different members of the CCP. For example, a CCP can
net the obligation of member X to deliver a security to the CCP against the CCP’s concurrent obligation
to deliver that same security to member Y. See 27. What Does a CCP Do? What Are the Pros and Cons?,
INT’L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS’N, http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/
repo-and-collateral-markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/27-what-does-a-ccp-do-what-arethe-pros-and-cons [https://perma.cc/FE2M-MRQK] [hereinafter What Does a CCP Do?] (describing the
process of netting for CCPs). In contrast, “[n]onstandard contracts cannot be netted, since each one’s
cash flow characteristics are different.” IMF, supra note 85, at 6.
130 Another reason the cost diﬀerential might be insigniﬁcant is that a signiﬁcant portion of
derivatives contracts, referred to as over-the-counter derivatives, are themselves not standardized.
Prior to postcrisis ﬁnancial regulation, most derivatives were OTC. Levitin, supra note 81, at 449.
Even after the ﬁnancial crisis, the notional amount of OTC derivatives has been estimated as $693
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nonderivative financial contracts are being documented on standard form
contracts developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) for documenting derivatives transactions. This is being done to gain
the advantage of bankruptcy law’s “safe harbor” exemptions for derivatives
contracts.131 Loan agreements and virtually any other type of financial contract
can be documented as a derivatives contract.132 Some textbooks are even
openly encouraging parties to document financing contracts as derivatives
contracts in order to take advantage of that safe harbor.133
Any cost differential could also be managed. The laws requiring central
clearing of derivatives contracts control transaction costs by limiting such
clearing to standardized derivatives contracts.134 Any laws requiring central
clearing of nonderivative financial contracts could likewise—and this Article
has proposed that any such laws should135—control transaction costs by limiting
such clearing to standardized136 nonderivative financial contracts. Appendix 2
of this Article discusses standardized nonderivative financial contracts.
The fact that CCPs are often associated with derivatives and commodities
exchanges,137 whereas nonderivative financial contracts are less likely to depend
on exchanges,138 might appear to create another possible transaction-cost

trillion worldwide. MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL
RELEASE OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2013, at 2 (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/
otc_hy1311.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ6Z-VBXE].
131 Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A PathDependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1752 (2014).
132 Id. at 1752.
133 See id.; see also Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 121 (2005); Bryan G. Faubus, Narrowing
the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for Derivatives to Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801, 828-29 (2010).
134 See also HECKINGER, RUFFINI & WELLS, supra note 37, at 31 (stating that “[w]hether or
not an OTC trade is cleared on a CCP depends on the degree of standardization of contract terms”);
IMF, supra note 85, at 12 (addressing that “U.S. authorities are proposing legislation that will
incentivize, if not mandate, clearing ‘eligible’ OTC derivatives through CCPs”); CFTC Reports, U.S.
COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCReports/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/Z34H-YRQ4] (“Standardized derivatives will be required to trade on
open platforms and be submitted for clearing to central counterparties . . . .”); cf. supra text
accompanying note 89 (observing that regulators have partly limited transaction costs by restricting
central clearing only to standardized derivatives contracts); supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
136 This Article does not examine whether nonstandardized financial contracts should be
centrally cleared. Cf. Hull, supra note 124, at 74-75 (advocating that all derivatives contracts—especially
nonstandard OTC contracts, because those are the most likely to be used for large speculative
positions that can increase systemic risk—be centrally cleared). Hull argues that the difficulties of
centrally clearing nonstandard derivatives contracts would be outweighed by the benefits, which
include reducing counterparty risk and increasing transparency. See id. at 76-77. He also says that
nonstandard contracts could be netted if they could be valued daily. Id.
137 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
138 A loan agreement, for example, is rarely traded on an exchange.
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differential.139 In recent years however, many CCPs have decoupled their
exchange affiliation and started operating as independent companies.140 This
suggests that their profitability, which is dependent on controlling transaction
costs, is not necessarily tied to particular exchanges.
2. Systemic Costs
The primary costs of centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts
would be, paradoxically, potentially increasing systemic costs: by
concentrating counterparty risk in CCPs, central clearing makes the CCPs
even more systemically important than the original counterparties.141 In other
words, central clearing would reduce the systemic costs of individual
systemically important counterparties but increase the systemic costs of
CCPs. The question is whether it reduces the overall systemic costs.
Even in the derivatives context, there is controversy whether central
clearing reduces overall systemic costs.142 Regulators assume, however, that
it does reduce those overall costs.143 This subsection’s focus is therefore on
whether central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts would change
that overall systemic cost balance.
Central clearing of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts would reduce the
systemic costs of individual systemically important counterparties the same
way—by having CCPs assume the counterparty risk—that central clearing of
derivatives contracts reduces those systemic costs. Therefore, if those CCPs
are protected against risk concentration at least as well as CCPs that centrally
clear derivatives contracts are protected, central clearing of nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts should not change that overall cost balance.144 Part IV of
this Article explains how those CCPs could be equally well protected.
139 No informational or expertise-related transaction-cost diﬀerential should result from CCPs
clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts, with which they are not familiar. The clearing members
themselves, not the CCP, value the credit risk on the contracts being cleared. Cf. supra text
accompanying note 117 (discussing counterparties as CCP clearing members).
140 See infra note 163 (observing that many CCPs have now become independent companies).
141 Cf. What Does a CCP Do?, supra note 129 (describing a drawback of centrally clearing
derivatives contracts as “concentrat[ing]” risk in CCPs, “which will themselves become potential
sources of systemic risk”). Their size, interconnectedness with clearing members, and lack of
substitutability make CCPs highly systemically risky. Cf. supra text accompanying note 55
(discussing size, interconnectedness, and substitutability as the three main determinants of systemic
risk). Central clearing might also increase the correlation of risks among systemically important
ﬁrms. The ﬁnancial crisis intensiﬁed when numerous systemically important ﬁrms began to fail
because of their correlated investments (in MBS).
142 See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
144 Central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts might even improve the overall cost
balance by enabling CCPs to clear a larger number of contracts. Cf. RODNEY GARRATT & PETER
ZIMMERMAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 717, DOES CENTRAL CLEARING
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Centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts might, however,
increase the perception of systemic costs tied to the so-called “too big to fail”
(TBTF) problem—that systemically important ﬁnancial ﬁrms might engage
in excessive risk taking because they would proﬁt from success and be bailed
out by the government to avoid a failure.145 There is an increasing worldwide
regulatory focus on trying to end the TBTF problem.146
Critics have argued, in the derivatives context, that CCPs are the “ultimate”
too big to fail organizations.147 Because a CCP is “a central node in the financial
system,” and thus highly interconnected with other financial institutions,148 its
failure could have effects similar to what was feared could happen if AIG had
failed during the financial crisis149—what has been described as “staring into
the abyss.”150 For example, a CCP’s failure could suspend all or a portion of the
market for derivatives transactions, causing systemic contagion including “fire
sales of collateral or derivatives contracts, exacerbating broad market
volatility.”151 The government would therefore almost certainly have to bail out
a failing CCP. And the expectation of a bailout could foster moral hazard,
incentivizing CCPs themselves to take greater risks.152
REDUCE COUNTERPARTY RISK IN REALISTIC FINANCIAL NETWORKS? 1 (2015) (arguing that a
CCP’s netting is unlikely to be valuable when the network relies on only a few key nodes).
145 This is primarily a problem of moral hazard; persons protected from the negative
consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take more risks. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too
Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 761 (2017)
(analyzing the TBTF problem and the causes of excessive risk taking).
146 See id. at 762-63 (discussing regulatory eﬀorts by the U.S. Federal Reserve and also by the
Financial Stability Board, an organization established by the G20 nations, to monitor and make
recommendations about the global ﬁnancial system).
147 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1394-95 (2011) (observing that centralized clearing of
derivatives would shift counterparty risk from individual counterparties to the CCP, thereby
concentrating the risk); Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1692 n.123
(2013) (collecting sources); Yadav, supra note 39, at 387, 391 (challenging the “academic and policy
consensus that clearinghouses adequately mitigate the risks of trading credit derivatives”).
148 Cf. supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (discussing interconnectedness as one of the
three systemic risk factors).
149 See, e.g., Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for
Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209,
259 (2014) (“The urge to backstop [a CCP] in the event of a market crisis would be considerable,
and governments could then be faced with the ultimate ‘TBTF’ entity.”).
150 Jeff Kearns & Robert Schmidt, From Davos to Big Sur, Geithner Recounts Staring into the Abyss,
BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2014, 12:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-09/
geithner-recounts-standing-at-big-sur-cliﬀ-edge-as-crisis-grew.
151 See Darrell Duﬃe, Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties (arguing that a CCP’s “fail[ure]
to meet its obligations to other systemically [important] clearing members” could cause that
contagion), in MAKING FAILURE FEASIBLE: HOW BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG
TO FAIL” 87, 88 (Kenneth E. Scott, Thomas H. Jackson & John B. Taylor eds., 2015).
152 Cf. Levitin, supra note 81, at 464 (arguing that, without proper regulation, CCPs may
engage in underpriced risk taking, thereby increasing systemic risk).
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Qualitatively, any such perception of systemic costs should be no different
whether CCPs clear derivatives contracts or nonderivative financial contracts.
Quantitatively, however, requiring nonderivative financial contracts to be centrally
cleared would add to the volume of CCP clearing, thereby possibly increasing that
perception. Such an increased perception would certainly represent a political
cost. It unlikely represents an increase in actual systemic costs, however, because
there is no real evidence that the TBTF problem increases risk taking.153
C. Balancing Benefits and Costs
The analysis in Sections III.A and III.B indicates that—other than
possible diﬀerences in the beneﬁts of multilateral netting—the beneﬁts and
the costs of centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts would roughly
parallel those of centrally clearing derivatives contracts. Both types of
contracts are standardized ﬁnancial contracts that have systemically
important counterparties.154 Although centrally clearing nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts might increase the perception of systemic costs tied to the
TBTF problem, any such increase would represent political, not actual, costs
and thus should not strictly be included in a cost–beneﬁt balancing.155
Accordingly, if the beneﬁts of centrally clearing derivatives contracts exceed
its costs (which, as discussed, is an untested premise156), then—again subject
to possible diﬀerences in the beneﬁts of multilateral netting—the beneﬁts of
centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts might also exceed its costs.
Because its cost–benefit balancing is based on rough approximations, an
untested premise, and possible differences in the benefits of multilateral netting,
this Article cannot—and does not purport to—conclude that regulation should
require central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts. Nonetheless, this
Article’s approach to cost–benefit balancing should provide a useful way of thinking
about whether regulators should impose that central clearing requirement.157
Schwarcz, supra note 145, at 764-69.
Derivatives contracts are at least likely to have, and the nonderivative financial contracts
analyzed in this Article are limited to those that have, at least one systemically important counterparty.
155 See C.W., Why Doing a Cost-Benefit Analysis Is Harder than It Looks, ECONOMIST: THE
ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/
04/23/why-doing-a-cost-benefit-analysis-is-harder-than-it-looks [https://perma.cc/3YVT-4XH6] (“The
aim [of a cost–beneﬁt analysis] is to provide an impartial, evidence-based judgment of the costs and
beneﬁts of a particular policy or project, without regard to its political ramifications.” (emphasis added)).
156 See supra text accompanying note 92. Recall that this Article builds on the widespread
reality of the central clearing requirement for derivatives contracts as an indicator that such clearing
may well reduce overall systemic risk, without necessarily agreeing whether it reduces that overall
risk. See supra text accompanying note 94.
157 Even detailed empirical research by the U.S. Oﬃce of Financial Research has not yet
provided a more useful way of thinking about the value of requiring central clearing. Cf.
BAKLANOVA, DALTON & TOMPAIDIS, supra note 78, at 7 (reaching a noncommittal conclusion, itself
153
154
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In the United States, there may be an additional way to think about the value
of requiring central clearing for nonderivative financial contracts. Recall that
Congress has viewed systemic risk regulation so important as to exempt it from
traditional cost–benefit analysis.158 If regulation requiring central clearing for
nonderivative financial contracts follows that mandate, the only cost–benefit
question would be whether the regulation reduces overall systemic costs, i.e.,
whether its reduction of systemic costs of individual systemically important
counterparties outweighs the increase of systemic costs caused by concentrating
CCP counterparty risk. By ignoring transaction costs, that affords an even easier
cost–benefit balancing in favor of regulation requiring central clearing for
nonderivative financial contracts.
IV. ADAPTING AND ENHANCING CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY
RISK PROTECTION
The foregoing cost–beneﬁt analysis presupposes that CCPs used for
centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts would be protected against
risk concentration at least as well as are CCPs used for centrally clearing
derivatives contracts.159 This Part explains why those CCPs could be equally
well protected. To that end, Section IV.A examines how current protections
could be adapted to CCPs used to clear nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.
Thereafter, Section IV.B examines how those protections could be enhanced,
which would make central clearing of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts even
more likely to satisfy a cost–beneﬁt balancing.
A. Adapting Existing Protections
All of the current protections against CCP risk concentration either would
apply, or could be adapted, to CCPs used to clear nonderivative financial
contracts.160 CCPs currently employ various protections against risk
concentration, and thus against the risk of default.161 To minimize these risks,

based on “[s]everal caveats,” as to whether “the potential beneﬁts outweigh the costs” for expanding
central clearing of repo transactions to transactions involving nondealers).
158 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
159 See supra text accompanying note 144.
160 Although the textual discussion primarily addresses U.S.-based CCPs, the European Union
has similar protections against CCP risk concentration. See Bas Zebregs & Victor de Serière, Efforts
to Strengthen the Clearing and Settlement Framework of the Capital Markets Union, in CAPITAL MARKETS
UNION IN EUROPE 526, 531-35 (Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2018).
161 See NORMAN, supra note 6, at 10 (“Because a CCP represents a single point of failure, it
needs to be bullet proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andrew G. Haldane, Exec.
Dir., Bank of Eng., Remarks at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 45th Annual Conference
“Reforming Financial Regulation”: Small Lessons from a Big Crisis 5 (May 8, 2009) (transcript
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CCPs typically grant central clearing services to a relatively small number of
firms, normally limited to well-capitalized banks and other large financial
institutions that become “clearing members” of the CCP.162 By becoming
clearing members, firms assume various responsibilities that help to support
the CCP’s financial integrity.163 These include agreeing to maintain sufficient
collateral to reimburse the CCP for payment of the clearing member’s
individual counterparty obligations,164 to contribute (on a pro rata basis with
the other clearing members) to a loss-absorbency fund that can be used to cover
the CCP’s losses in case a clearing member fails to so reimburse the CCP,165
and to pay capital assessments into the CCP as needed to keep it solvent.166

available at https://www.bis.org/review/r090710e.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RS4-GD3F])); cf. supra
note 8 and accompanying text (observing that counterparty risk is sometimes called default risk).
162 See Levitin, supra note 81, at 451 (describing the various risk management tools available to
CCPs); see also INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., INC., MANAGE YOUR RISK: HOW CLEARING
WORKS 2 (2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/How_Clearing_Works.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A38C-9Q42] (“[C]learing houses have in place a comprehensive set of procedures and a robust risk
management framework that includes: [r]eal-time position monitoring[, i]ntraday mark to market
margining[, s]ubstantial default resources[, r]igorous stress testing[, c]omprehensive oversight[, and
e]xtensive transparency.”). Firms other than clearing members can only get access to the derivatives
market through clearing members. NORMAN, supra note 6, at 10.
163 Originally, CCPs were owned by their clearing members, but many CCPs have now
demutualized and become part of publicly traded companies. CCPs nonetheless continue to enforce
strict membership responsibilities to help support their own ﬁnancial integrity. Ruﬃni, supra note
78, at 91; cf. Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough,
the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 635-40 (2017) (assessing the
implications of diﬀerent ownership structures on CCPs’ resilience). These strict membership
responsibilities, however, typically limit clearing members to large and often systemically important
banks and other ﬁrms, thereby linking CCP risk back to those ﬁrms, which in turn could “lead to a
self-reinforcing [destabilising] feedback loop” in “periods of stress.” Umar Faruqui, Wenqian Huang
& Előd Takáts, Clearing Risks in OTC Derivatives Markets: The CCP-Bank Nexus, BIS Q. REV., Dec.
2018, at 73, 74-78; see also id. at 78 (observing that a “handful of systemically important banks
typically comprise the main clearing members”). Because of this potential for a self-reinforcing
feedback loop, “the risks of banks and CCPs should be considered jointly, rather than in isolation.”
Id. at 74. Faruqui, Huang, and Takáts emphasize though that their ﬁndings “should not be used to
assess the relative merits of central and bilateral clearing.” Id.
164 This can help a CCP avoid illiquidity, especially by requiring clearing members to post variation
margin on a daily basis depending on changes in the counterparties’ positions. Sergei A. Davydenko,
Insolvency, Illiquidity, and the Risk of Default 1-6 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/davydenko/liquidity.pdf [https://perma.cc/35DR-CXPB]).
165 This creates an incentive for each clearing member to monitor the creditworthiness of the other
clearing members. Cf. Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 15, at 11 (arguing that “the mutualized risk characteristic
of the CCP” incentivizes clearing members to take active steps to try to reduce the CCP’s risk).
166 NORMAN, supra note 6, at 10. A risk-management oﬃcer of a large CCP observed at a
Federal Reserve conference attended by the author that, in his experience, clearing members are
ordinarily required to prefund one assessment and are subject to one additional assessment, after
which they could choose to resign from membership.
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To further minimize default risk,167 a CCP may buy protection to hedge
its payment obligations.168 To cover a worst-case scenario where these
measures are insuﬃcient and the CCP faces insolvency or illiquidity,169 U.S.
law at least gives CCPs that are classiﬁed as ﬁnancial market utilities (FMUs)
access to central bank emergency funding.170
Many of these protections would apply to CCPs equally whether they
clear derivatives contracts or nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts. For example,
the distinction between those contracts is irrelevant both to a CCP’s ability
to buy protection to hedge its potential obligations to pay a net aggregate
liability171 and to a clearing member’s responsibility to maintain suﬃcient
collateral to reimburse the CCP for payment of its individual counterparty
obligations.172 Similarly, that distinction is irrelevant to a central bank’s
decision to grant CCPs access to central bank emergency funding.173
The distinction between those contracts might be relevant, however, to
certain protections against CCP risk concentration. For example, recall that
CCPs used to clear derivatives contracts typically grant central clearing
services to only a relatively small number of well-capitalized large financial
institutions, which assume various responsibilities to help support the CCP’s
167 Through multilateral netting, a CCP normally also has the right to periodically net and set
oﬀ its clearing members’ aggregate counterparty rights and liabilities, so the CCP is only required
to make a payment if there is a net aggregate liability. The extent to which this actually reduces
risk—or at least, systemic risk—is somewhat uncertain. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
168 For example, if the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s CCP, CME Clearing Services, assumes
responsibility to clear a CDS contract that covers the risk of a commodities trade, CME Clearing Services
may itself choose to hedge that risk by purchasing protection under a corresponding CDS contract.
169 Insolvency means that the CCP’s liabilities exceed the value of its assets whereas illiquidity
means that the CCP does not have enough cash or near-cash assets to pay its current liabilities as they
come due. A CCP thus can be illiquid without being insolvent, and vice versa. CCP illiquidity is the
more common and pressing issue because an illiquid CCP cannot pay all of its counterparty
obligations. Insolvency is often difficult to determine because asset valuation in a financially distressed
situation is often hotly contested, including whether to value the assets at their going-concern or their
liquidation value. See, e.g., Matthew C. Klein, Illiquid, Insolvent, What’s the Difference?, FIN.
TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Sep. 30, 2014, 3:50 PM), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/09/30/1988932/
illiquid-insolvent-whats-the-difference [https://perma.cc/E6BP-VJNP].
170 Section 806(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act gives the Federal Reserve power to provide discount-window
lending, a form of liquidity, to FMUs “in unusual or exigent circumstances.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 806(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1811 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2012)).
171 Cf. supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the purchase of hedging protection).
172 For loan agreements, requiring clearing members to post variation margin depending on changes
in the counterparties’ positions might be tied to changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness as evidenced by
any downgrades of their senior debt credit ratings. Cf. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS 2 (2017),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CX-LAQV] (summarizing and
comparing the use of credit ratings to assess credit risk under the Basel III and their predecessor (Basel II)
capital-adequacy requirements).
173 Cf. supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (discussing central bank emergency funding).
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financial integrity.174 Limiting CCP clearing membership in that way does not
appear to impede central clearing of standardized derivatives contracts because
most parties to such contracts are in fact well-capitalized large financial
institutions.175 That limitation, however, might impede central clearing of
nonderivative financial contracts with smaller or less well-capitalized firms as
counterparties.176 For CCPs used to clear those nonderivative financial
contracts, these “member-provided” protections would need to be adapted.
Fortuitously, a recent study by the U.S. Office of Financial Research suggests
how to adapt member-provided protections to smaller or less well-capitalized
ﬁrms as counterparties. The study considers whether central clearing of repo
transactions,177 which currently occurs for transactions between dealers,
should be expanded to also cover transactions between dealers and
nondealers.178 It assumes that only the dealers are CCP clearing members.179
It also recognizes, as does this Article, that member-provided protections are
needed to help oﬀset the CCPs’ increased risk concentration.180 The study
suggests that, to “ensure that [a] CCP could withstand potential losses from
[nondealer] defaults,” its clearing members should make “additional funding
contributions” to the CCP.181 That same approach—requiring the CCP
clearing members to make any additional funding needed to support the
CCP’s ﬁnancial integrity—could also be used to protect CCPs that clear
nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.182

See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text.
Cf. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITY 3 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/
financial-markets/derivatives/pub-derivatives-quarterly-qtr3-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZL9-SUFA]
(reporting that “[a] small group of large financial institutions continues to dominate derivative activity
in the U.S. commercial banking system”).
176 For example, a borrower on a loan agreement could be a medium-sized company, or a large company
that is less well capitalized than a financial institution. The minimum-potential-payment-obligation limitation
may well exclude the need to centrally clear smaller loans. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
177 For an explanation of repo transactions, see supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
178 See BAKLANOVA, DALTON & TOMPAIDIS, supra note 78, at 3.
179 See id. (observing that “[e]xpanding access to repo CCPs would involve centrally clearing
bilateral transactions between dealers, who are members of CCPs, and their clients (nondealers),
who are not members”).
180 See id. (observing that if “a repo CCP were expanded to process repo transactions involving
nondealers, the exposures of the CCP would increase”).
181 Id.
182 The Oﬃce of Financial Research study uses a model in which “dealers would clear and
guarantee transactions with the CCP on behalf of their [nondealer] clients.” Id. at 5. The discussion
above assumes that CCP clearing of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts follows that model.
174
175
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B. Enhancing the Protections
Another question is whether the protections against CCP risk
concentration could be enhanced. From the standpoint of enhancing
protection, nothing appears to distinguish CCPs used to clear derivatives
contracts from CCPs used to clear nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.
However, because centrally clearing nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts would
greatly expand the use of CCPs, regulators might consider more proactively
protecting them—regardless of which contracts they clear.
Ringfencing represents at least one way to more proactively protect CCPs.
Ringfencing refers to using regulation and contracting to “legally deconstruct[]
a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk.”183 This can consist
of “separating risky assets from the firm, . . . preventing the firm itself from
engaging in risky activities or investing in risky assets, or . . . protecting the
firm from affiliate and bankruptcy risks.”184 In the context of a CCP, this might
involve limiting dividends and other payments to affiliates185 and making the
CCP part of a bankruptcy-remote structure.186
Because it is costly, ringfencing is most applicable to protect monopoly or
semimonopoly entities, which have few if any substitutes, that provide
essential public services; thus, it is commonly used to protect public utilities
that produce and disseminate electric energy.187 This is especially valuable
where the utility is part of a holding company or other corporate structure
that involves nonutility risk, such that insulation of the utility from that risk
helps to assure unimpaired continuation of the public services.188
CCPs, like public utilities, provide essential public services—in the case of
CCPs, by (arguably) reducing systemic risk and thus ensuring the ongoing
operation of the financial system. Also, like public utilities, CCPs have few if any
substitutes;189 indeed, they are often best situated to perform clearing services.190
Furthermore, CCPs are often part of a corporate structure that involves non-CCP
risk. Ringfencing would be especially valuable in that last context.
For example, ICE Clear Credit, a CCP that provides central counterparty
clearing services for CDS contracts, is an indirect subsidiary of
Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 72 (2013).
Id.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 74.
Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 15, at 14 (observing that “there are few substitutes for most
systemically important CCPs”).
190 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 157, 160, 174 (2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
56V4-E8PV].
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

1362

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1327

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.191 Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. engages in
an aggressive acquisition strategy192 that has caused it to incur significant
debt,193 and “[m]any aspects of [its] business . . .[also] involve substantial risks
of liability.”194 Ringfencing ICE Clear Credit would help to protect it from its
parent company’s financial and operating risks, thereby assuring continued
performance of the CCP’s clearing services even if the parent fails.195
Using ringfencing to more proactively protect CCPs would reduce
systemic costs but increase transaction costs. If the reduction of systemic costs
is greater than the increase in transaction costs, ringfencing would make
central clearing of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts even more likely to satisfy
a cost–beneﬁt balancing.
V. JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES
This Article has analyzed whether regulators should expand the central
clearing requirement to include nonderivative financial contracts. The very
idea that regulators should require financial institutions to centrally clear their
financial contracts—whether derivatives or nonderivative contracts—raises
fundamental questions about the justification for financial regulation.
Analytically, this Article so far has utilized the standard justification: that
financial regulation is justified if its benefits exceed its costs.196 This Part V
examines that justification in more depth. To that end, Section V.A examines
whether regulators should mandate how financial institutions control their
risk. Section V.B then examines whether regulators should require financial
institutions to mutualize risk.

Id. at 172.
See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2017), http://ir.theice.com/~/
media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2016/2016-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA2K-QF82]
(“We may be very acquisitive.”).
193 See id. at 31 (“Following our acquisition of NYSE and Interactive Data, we have a signiﬁcant
amount of indebtedness outstanding on a consolidated basis.”).
194 See id. at 33 (“Many aspects of our business . . . involve substantial risks of liability . . . . For
example, dissatisfied market participants that have traded on our electronic platform . . . may make
claims regarding the quality of trade execution, or allege improperly confirmed or settled trades,
abusive trading practices, security and confidentiality breaches, mismanagement or even fraud against
us or our participants . . . . An adverse resolution of any lawsuit or claim against us may require us to
pay substantial damages . . . .”).
195 As another example, CME Clearing, a CCP that clears the vast majority of the derivatives
contracts for U.S. futures, options on futures, and commodity options, is an unincorporated division
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 190, at 157.
Ringfencing CME Clearing could help to insulate it from exchange-related risks, thereby assuring
unimpaired continuation of its clearing services even if the exchange fails.
196 See supra notes 77, 84 and accompanying text.
191
192
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A. Should Regulators Mandate How Financial Institutions Control Their Risk?
The standard justification for financial regulation presents a puzzle, at least
when applied to risk taking by sophisticated financial institutions: Why would the
benefits of financial regulation ever exceed its costs? In principle, those institutions
should know best how to control their own risk. To the extent they are protecting
their investors, they also have incentives to control that risk. For these reasons, bank
regulation “rarely mandates a specific way [for a financial institution] to mitigate
risk, ie [sic] whether to take out insurance or to take assets as collateral, etc.”197
The primary goal of financial regulation, however, should be to correct
market failures.198 Regulation that corrects a market failure might well provide
benefits that exceed the regulation’s costs. Risk taking by sophisticated
financial institutions can be subject to market failures, most typically
evidenced by externalities.199 For example, government deposit insurance is
commonly seen as distorting a deposit-taking bank’s control of risk. Such
insurance increases risk taking because if the bank fails, much of the cost of its
failure would be externalized onto the government and taxpayers.200
To help control that risk taking, regulators commonly impose capital
requirements on banks.201 Most notably, the Basel Accords require banks to
maintain minimum equity (or “capital”) levels tied to their loan exposure, in
order to protect them against unexpected losses.202 The scholarship on

197 Peter O. Mülbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION 365, 395 (Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015).
198 See, e.g., DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE 1990S
21 (1990) (characterizing regulating markets to correct market failure as the “public interest theory”);
cf. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (deﬁning
market failure as an “imperfection in a price system that prevents eﬃcient allocation of resources”).
199 Although economists often categorize externalities as a type of market failure, externalities
more precisely are caused by market failures. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial
Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1799-1800 (2013).
200 See, e.g., Robert L. Hetzel, Should Increased Regulation of Bank Risk-Taking Come from
Regulators or from the Market?, 95 ECON. Q. 161, 166 (2009) (illustrating that “[a] financial safety net
constituted by deposit insurance” can lead to market failure because “[i]n good times, bank
shareholders do well, while in extremely bad times the insurance fund bails out the bank’s depositors
and debtholders”). Deposit insurance might also cause market failure by “worsen[ing] the incentives
of depositors to monitor bank risk strategy.” GIANNI DE NICOLÒ ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND,
EXTERNALITIES AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 6 (2012), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/
IMF006/12825-9781475504095/12825-9781475504095/12825-9781475504095_A001.xml [https://perma.cc/
LXT3-AXZS].
201 See, e.g., George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation,
106 ECON. J. 688, 688, 694-96 (1996) (concluding that bank capital regulation is necessary “to reduce
the negative externalities resulting from government-imposed deposit insurance”).
202 Kern Alexander & Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quandary: Unsystematic Eﬀorts
to Reform Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION
127, 134-35 (Ross P. Buckley et al. eds., 2016).
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controlling ﬁnancial institution risk taking is relatively limited however,203
focusing mostly on bank capital regulation.204 That scholarship has little
relevance to this Article’s focus on regulation requiring central clearing.205
Regulation requiring central clearing addresses a diﬀerent market failure
that causes externalities. Systemically important ﬁrms, by virtue of their
systemic importance, may be motivated to engage in excessive risk taking.
They would proﬁt by, and therefore internalize the beneﬁts of, successful risk
taking; whereas if their risk taking fails, they either would be bailed out by
the government (thereby externalizing losses onto the government and
taxpayers)206 or would externalize much of the systemic harm of their failure
onto other market participants and the public.207
The primary goal of requiring central clearing should be to correct this
market failure to the extent it arises from systemically important ﬁrms
engaging in ﬁnancial contracting.208 This Article thus limits its analysis to
central clearing of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts that have at least one
systemically important counterparty.209 Regulation requiring central clearing
helps to correct this market failure by reducing the likelihood of a
systemically important counterparty’s default.210 This explains why central
clearing regulation is seen as a “notable exception” to the law’s reluctance to
mandate speciﬁc risk-mitigation measures.211

203 Cf. Gazi Ishak Kara & S. Mehmet Ozsoy, Bank Regulation Under Fire Sale Externalities 2
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2016-26, 2016) (recognizing that
“the guidance from theoretical literature on the regulation of liquidity and the interaction between
liquidity and capital regulations is quite limited”).
204 See, e.g., Marc Saidenberg & Til Schuermann, The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions
for Research 2 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-14, 2003).
205 Indeed, most of the financial institutions this Article discusses are not even deposit-taking
banks. Cf. Financial Stability Oversight Council: Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8LBW-CAPE]
(last updated Mar. 6, 2019, 4:22 PM) (stating that nonbank financial companies and financial market
utilities can also be designated as SIFIs). Also, most SIFIs are bank holding companies that do not
themselves take deposits. Id.
206 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
207 Schwarcz, supra note 145, at 770-71; see also Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 206 (explaining this
externalization of systemic harm as “a type of tragedy of the commons”). It is a tragedy of the commons
insofar as market participants suffer from the actions of other market participants; it is a more standard
externality insofar as nonmarket participants suffer from the actions of market participants.
208 That is a goal of macroprudential regulation, which (as discussed) refers to ﬁnancial
regulation that is concerned with the fundamental stability of the ﬁnancial system, in contrast to
microprudential regulation which is concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of individual
ﬁnancial institutions. See supra note 10.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
210 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
211 Cf. Mülbert, supra note 197, at 395 (observing that central clearing regulation is a “notable
exception” to that reluctance under EU law).
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The foregoing analysis explains why central clearing can control
systemic risk. Next consider mandating central clearing as a means of
mutualizing, and thereby limiting, risk.
B. Should Regulators Require Financial Institutions to Mutualize Risk?
This question is eﬀectively a subset of the prior question: if regulators
should mandate how ﬁnancial institutions control risk, should they require
those institutions to mutualize risk? Although fully answering this question
is beyond this Article’s scope, consider the following possible observations for
beginning to answer it.
Requiring central clearing through CCPs helps to mutualize default
losses.212 Federal Reserve economists indeed observe that “[m]utualization of
risk is . . . a key distinguishing feature of CCP risk management as compared
to bank risk management.”213 Mutualization of risk is a form of private
insurance; it generally refers to dividing a risk among multiple parties to
reduce the chance that its occurrence will cause signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss to
any one party.214 Central clearing mutualizes clearing-and-settlement risk
among a CCP’s clearing members, many of whom are systemically important
ﬁrms,215 by making each responsible for paying speciﬁed amounts—such as
contributing to a loss-absorbency fund and paying capital assessments as
needed to keep the CCP solvent for the beneﬁt of the CCP and its clearing
members.216 That, in turn, corrects the market failure discussed in Section
V.A by reducing the likelihood of any clearing member’s default.
But correcting a market failure does not itself justify regulation. As
discussed, proposed regulation additionally must satisfy a cost–beneﬁt
analysis.217 Part III has argued that central clearing may well satisfy that

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 15, at 7.
See Roe, supra note 147, at 1660 (“This risk spreading would conceivably stop the ﬁrst
domino from falling. Or, if it falls anyway, the costs of its failure could be dissipated by multiple
ﬁnancial institutions taking a piece of the risk and small part of the loss.”).
215 For example, the Options Clearing Corporation’s clearing members include Deutsche Bank
Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, and Citigroup Global
Markets Inc. OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., supra note 118, at 47. Even if a clearing member is merely
an affiliate of a systemically important firm, that firm is likely to support it. Cf. Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., How Should We Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates? (observing that “banks and
other financial institutions have a powerful reputational interest in supporting their troubled nonbank
subsidiaries, regardless of the formalities of corporate separation”), in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION
AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 65, 81 (Patricia C. McCoy ed., 2002).
216 See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 77, at 263 (explaining that “[c]ost-beneﬁt analysis is best
understood as a way for agencies to ensure that their decisions are informed”). Existing law at most
requires a traditional cost–beneﬁt analysis. See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 167-68.
212
213
214
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analysis, at least when applied to clearing standardized nonderivative
ﬁnancial contracts with one or more systemically important counterparties.
Viewing central clearing as a way to mutualize risk raises a broader issue:
would regulators be justified in going beyond clearing risk and requiring, for
example, the mutualization of investment risk of systemically important firms?
This issue has become important to the regulatory debate over whether to require
a general privatized systemic risk fund—such as the Systemic Emergency
Insurance Fund proposed by Professors Gordon and Muller218 or, by analogy to
FDIC deposit insurance, the systemic risk fund subsidized by market-participant
premiums proposed by Professor Anabtawi and the author.219
From the standpoint of systemically harmful externalities, investment risk
appears to be at least as critical as clearing risk. Recall that the counterparty risk
that caused Lehman Brothers’ failure, which contributed to the financial crisis,
arose because of its investments in MBS.220 Similarly, the counterparty risk that
caused AIG’s near failure arose under derivatives contracts only because of the
collapse of the MBS market.221 Even the so-called Volcker Rule,222 originally
advocated for as a panacea for systemic financial instability,223 focuses exclusively
on investment risk.224 The benefits of mutualizing investment risk of systemically
important firms should therefore equal or exceed those of mutualizing those
firms’ clearing risk. If the costs of mutualizing that investment risk are no greater
than the costs of mutualizing that clearing risk, regulation requiring that
mutualization of investment risk may well be justified.225

218 Jeﬀrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers
and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 204-06 (2011).
219 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 147, at 1401-02 (arguing that systemic risk regulation
is justiﬁed by externalities and that a privatized systemic risk fund can “correct for risk-spillovers in
ﬁnancial markets by requiring ﬁrms to take into account the impact of their behavior on systemic
stability”); cf. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1015-23 (2011) (arguing that systemically important ﬁrms
should be required to pay risk-based insurance premiums which would be used to fund liquidation
of failed ﬁrms and thus reduce potential bailout costs); Email Attachment from Paolo Saguato, supra
note 15 (observing that the “mutualisation and privatization of the guarantee fund might push down
the line the necessity of a public bailout”). Such a fund would represent a type of private ordering.
Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 324-29.
220 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
222 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
619, § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codiﬁed at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)).
223 See, e.g., Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading
and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 531-32 (2011).
224 The Volcker Rule imposes limitations on proprietary trading in order to prevent banks and
other systemically important ﬁrms from investing in risky assets. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1486 (2016).
225 Cf. supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing cost–beneﬁt analysis).
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Normatively, however, one might question whether proposed ﬁnancial
regulation should be justiﬁed merely because it would correct a market failure
and satisfy a traditional cost–beneﬁt analysis.226 Scholars should consider
whether regulators should go beyond that traditional analysis and also
compare the costs and beneﬁts of alternative reasonable regulatory
proposals.227 For example, even assuming that the anticipated beneﬁts of
mutualizing risk through central clearing, or through a systemic risk fund,
exceed its anticipated costs, regulators may want to—and perhaps should also
be required to—compare the anticipated costs and beneﬁts of reasonable
alternatives, such as requiring private hedging against counterparty risk.
CONCLUSION
The United States and many other countries are requiring most derivatives
contracts to be cleared through central counterparties. Regulators believe this
central clearing requirement reduces counterparty risk, in turn reducing the
risk that counterparty failure could trigger a systemic economic collapse. This
Article examines whether the law should also require central clearing for
nonderivative financial contracts, such as loan agreements, whose aggregate
counterparty exposure greatly exceeds that on derivatives contracts.
This Article shows that, contrary to media portrayal, the systemic riskiness
of derivatives contracts turns on the nature of their counterparties, not on their
inherent nature. This insight indicates that nonderivative financial contracts
with systemically important counterparties could also be systemically risky. In
theory, requiring those financial contracts to be centrally cleared could
therefore help reduce systemic costs arising from that counterparty risk.
Regulation imposing that requirement would be justiﬁed only if its overall
reduction of systemic costs outweighs the requirement’s transaction costs. To
reduce transaction costs, this Article proposes that any such regulation be
further limited to material nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts that are
standardized. Because nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts are increasingly being
documented in standardized format, this proposal should not unduly limit
the beneﬁts of extending central clearing.
In principle, the regulation should also achieve an overall reduction of
systemic costs. Central clearing reduces systemic costs arising from the
counterparty risk of individual systemically important ﬁrms. Although
226 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (observing that such an analysis is satisﬁed
by showing that the anticipated beneﬁts of speciﬁc proposed regulation should exceed the
regulation’s anticipated costs).
227 The author has separately argued for such a consequence-based inquiry to assess proposed
regulation from alternative perspectives. See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 169 (showing that in
traditional cost–beneﬁt analysis, “regulators only superﬁcially consider alternatives”).
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central clearing can also increase systemic costs by concentrating
counterparty risk in CCPs, CCPs used to clear derivatives contracts are
signiﬁcantly protected from that risk concentration. This Article examines
how those protections could be adapted to, and possibly also enhanced for,
CCPs used to clear nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts.
Because its cost–benefit balancing is based on rough approximations, an
untested premise, and possible differences in the benefits of multilateral
netting,228 this Article does not conclude that regulation should necessarily require
central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts. Instead, it argues that if the
benefits of centrally clearing derivatives contracts exceed its costs, then the
benefits of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts might also exceed
its costs. This Article’s analysis nonetheless should help regulators think about
expanding the central clearing requirement to nonderivative financial contracts. It
also helps answer important legal questions about why, and the extent to which,
regulators should mandate how financial institutions should control risk, and
whether they should require financial institutions to mutualize risk.229

See supra notes 109–23 and accompanying text.
The author is separately examining how the insight that nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts
with systemically important counterparties could also be systemically risky informs derivatives
regulation as well as ﬁnancial regulation more generally.
228
229
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APPENDIX 1: CENTRALLY CLEARING NONDERIVATIVE
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
This Appendix 1 illustrates how nonderivative financial contracts could be
centrally cleared and compares that to the central clearing of derivatives
contracts. The comparison shows that, in principle, central clearing would
work identically for clearing both types of contracts. In practice however, there
would be one difference in clearing: because relatively more counterparties on
derivatives contracts are likely to be CCP clearing members, CCPs clearing
derivatives contracts could employ more multilateral netting than CCPs
clearing nonderivative financial contracts.
A. Central Clearing of Derivatives Contracts
Assume that Parties A and B—both clearing members of a CCP—enter
into a derivatives contract and that, on the settlement date a year hence, Party
B is obligated to pay $1,000,000 to Party A. If this derivatives contract is
centrally cleared, the CCP would be obligated to pay that $1,000,000 to Party
A. Party A thus is subject to the CCP’s credit risk, not Party B’s credit risk.
Once the CCP pays the $1,000,000 to Party A, the CCP has a
reimbursement claim for that amount against Party B.230 Assuming Party B
pays that amount to the CCP, the CCP is made whole. If Party B defaults on
paying that amount to the CCP, the CCP might become financially distressed.
To reduce that likelihood of ﬁnancial distress, the CCP’s clearing
members set credit criteria with which the CCP must comply when clearing
a contract. To mitigate concentrating systemic risk in the CCP, regulators set
the capitalization and other requirements by which clearing members support
the CCP. Part IV of this Article discusses these criteria and requirements.
B. Central Clearing of Nonderivative Financial Contracts
Using this Article’s example of a loan agreement as a typical nonderivative
financial contract, assume Party A makes a $1,000,000 loan to Party B, repayable
in a year with 5% interest. At the loan’s maturity (i.e., settlement) date, Party B
is obligated to repay Party A $1,000,000 principal and $50,000 interest. If this loan
agreement is centrally cleared and Party A and Party B are clearing members, the
CCP would be obligated to pay $1,050,000 to Party A on the settlement date.
Party A thus is subject to the CCP’s credit risk, not Party B’s credit risk.
Once the CCP pays the $1,050,000 to Party A, the CCP has a
reimbursement claim for that amount against Party B. Assuming Party B pays

230

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

1370

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1327

that amount to the CCP, the CCP is made whole. If Party B defaults on paying
that amount to the CCP, the CCP might become financially distressed.
To reduce that likelihood of financial distress, the CCP’s clearing members
set credit criteria with which the CCP must comply when clearing a contract;
and to mitigate concentrating systemic risk in the CCP, regulators set the
capitalization and other requirements by which clearing members support the
CCP. Again, Part IV of this Article discusses these criteria and requirements.
The foregoing comparison shows that central clearing would work
identically, in principle, for clearing both derivatives contracts and
nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts. Next consider the diﬀerence, in practice, of
clearing these diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial contracts.
C. Central Clearing’s Diﬀerence in Practice
This difference would turn on the CCP’s ability to engage in multilateral
netting. Recall that multilateral netting refers to a CCP’s ability to net offsetting
payment obligations among its clearing members.231 Because relatively more
counterparties on derivatives contracts are likely to be CCP clearing members,232
CCPs clearing derivatives contracts could employ more multilateral netting than
CCPs clearing nonderivative financial contracts. Here’s why.
A CCP clearing a derivatives contract between clearing members Party A
and Party B may also be clearing other derivatives contracts involving one or
more of these parties and other CCP clearing members, such as Party C. If
Party A owes Party B $1,000,000 and Party B owes Party C $1,000,000, Party
B’s oﬀsetting obligations will be set oﬀ (i.e., netted) and Party A will simply
owe Party C the $1,000,000.233 In contrast, a CCP clearing a nonderivative
ﬁnancial contract between clearing members Party A and Party B is less likely
to be clearing other nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts involving one or more
of these parties and other CCP clearing members.
The signiﬁcance of this diﬀerence is unclear, however. Although
multilateral netting can increase CCP operational eﬃciencies,234 it is less
certain that it can reduce systemic risk. Going beyond the sources cited,235
the author is personally skeptical that multilateral netting reduces systemic
risk. The primary argument that it does reduce systemic risk is that it reduces
the CCP’s aggregate counterparty risk exposure.236 Thus, in the previous
See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra note 123.
See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text; cf. supra text accompanying note 111 (discussing
that multilateral netting allows for the aggregate oﬀset of positions).
231
232
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paragraph’s example,237 the CCP’s aggregate exposure to $2,000,000 of
counterparty risk (owing $1,000,000 to Party B and $1,000,000 to Party C) is
reduced to $1,000,000 (i.e., after multilateral netting, only owing $1,000,000
to Party C).
The possible fallacy of that argument is that it ignores the credit
correlations and setoﬀ rights that are inherent in the CCP’s chain of making
payments. To understand why, compare multilateral netting and bilateral (i.e.,
the absence of multilateral) netting, in each case based on the prior example.
With multilateral netting, after the CCP pays $1,000,000 to Party C, the CCP
will seek reimbursement of that amount from Party A. If Party A reimburses
the CCP, the CCP would be ﬁne; but in the unlikely event Party A fails to
reimburse the CCP, the CCP’s ﬁnancial integrity would be threatened and it
would have to seek the backup protections discussed in Part IV of this Article.
With bilateral netting, the CCP would pay $1,000,000 to Party B and
$1,000,000 to Party C. After the CCP pays $1,000,000 to Party C, the CCP will
seek reimbursement of that amount from Party B. Because the CCP just paid
that amount to Party B, Party B would almost certainly be able to pay the
reimbursement. Furthermore, as a matter of law, the CCP should have the
right to set off the $1,000,000 it is obligated to pay to and to receive as
reimbursement from Party B.238 Party B therefore should not present a credit
risk to the CCP. Party A, however, presents the same credit risk for bilateral
as for multilateral netting. After the CCP pays $1,000,000 to Party B, the CCP
will seek reimbursement of that amount from Party A. If Party A reimburses
the CCP, the CCP would be fine; but in the unlikely event Party A fails to
reimburse the CCP, the CCP’s financial integrity would be threatened and it
would have to seek the backup protections discussed in Part IV of this Article.

See supra text accompanying note 233.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that parties generally have the right to
set oﬀ mutually oﬀsetting matured obligations).
237
238
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APPENDIX 2: STANDARDIZING NONDERIVATIVE
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
This Appendix 2 explains how to standardize nonderivative ﬁnancial
contracts. The explanation should start with trying to understand the
standardization of derivatives contracts. The meaning of standardizing a
derivatives contract is somewhat ambiguous however. The most common
interpretation is functional: if a CCP agrees to clear a derivatives contract,
that contract is presumed to be standardized.239 Using this functional
deﬁnition, a nonderivative ﬁnancial contract would be presumed to be
standardized if a CCP agrees to clear it.
The Committee of European Securities Regulators has subdivided the
concept of standardization into three components: legal uniformity, process
uniformity, and product uniformity.240 Legal uniformity refers to “standard
transaction documentation and deﬁnitions.”241 Contracts that are
documented on ISDA forms are deemed to have legal uniformity.242 Because
many nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts are now documented on ISDA
forms,243 such contracts would likewise be deemed to have legal uniformity.
Eﬀorts are also underway to further standardize loan agreements to help
streamline the trading of participation interests in loans.244
Process uniformity refers to the use of automated electronic systems to
ensure that details of trades, such as transfers of securities and payments
therefor, are accurately recorded.245 In the author’s experience, payments on
239 See, e.g., Hearing to Examine the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Joint Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Agric. & the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Hon. Timothy
F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“We will employ a presumption that a derivative
contract that is accepted for clearing by any central counterparty is standardized.”); INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, PRODUCT REPRESENTATION FOR STANDARDIZED DERIVATIVES 4 (2011),
https://www.isda.org/a/EHiDE/product-representation-for-standardized-derivatives-20110414vfinal1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UM74-3HF9] (defining standardized OTC derivatives as “broadly speaking those
derivatives that will be centrally cleared or electronically executed”).
240 COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, STANDARDISATION AND EXCHANGE
TRADING OF OTC DERIVATIVES 6 (2010), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/library/
2015/11/10_610.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JPW-U4R9].
241 Id. at 6-7.
242 Id.
243 See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (observing this is being done to gain the
advantage of bankruptcy law’s safe harbor exemptions).
244 BRIDGET MARSH & TED BASTA, LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASSOCIATION AND THE LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET
1, 7 (2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL190000pub/newsletter/200803/marsh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2M2-V568] (discussing the eﬀorts of the Loan Syndications & Trading
Association (LSTA) to create new standard documents to help streamline the trading of loan
participations). The LSTA’s own website provides further background on that eﬀort. See LOAN
SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N, https://www.lsta.org/ [https://perma.cc/QL77-H5TX].
245 COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, supra note 240, at 7-8.
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material ﬁnancial contracts involving sophisticated parties—the subset of
contracts this Article discusses—are always recorded through automated
electronic systems. All of the nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts discussed in
this Article should therefore have process uniformity.
Product uniformity refers to financial products that have similar
features.246 This Article uses loan agreements to exemplify nonderivative
financial contracts.247 Because loan agreements have relatively straightforward
repayment schedules for principal and interest, they clearly should represent
a uniform product class. Indeed, at least one derivatives expert informed the
author that loan agreements, as products, tend to be much more uniform than
derivatives, in part because sellers want to retain control of the derivatives
product market through customization.248
The standardization of nonderivative ﬁnancial contracts for CCP clearing
thus appears to have a very low bar, encompassing at least all such contracts
that (as is common) are documented on ISDA forms as well as all such
contracts that a CCP in fact agrees to clear. This concept of standardization
is very diﬀerent, for example, from the custom and practice for standardizing
letters of credit, which is necessary to enable low-level bank oﬃcers to
determine, on a real-time basis and without knowledge of nonbanking
terminology or the exercise of judgment, whether documents presented by
the letter-of-credit beneﬁciary satisfy the payment conditions.249

Id. at 9.
See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
This observation is based on a discussion with P.R.I.M.E. Finance expert colleagues at the January
22-23, 2018 annual conference in The Hague. These colleagues and the author are members of P.R.I.M.E.
Finance’s Panel of Recognized International Market Experts in Finance, consisting of the most senior people
in the financial markets. See About Us, P.R.I.M.E. FIN., https://primefinancedisputes.org/page/about-us
[https://perma.cc/UA3R-DHZM]; cf. RUTTER ASSOCS. LLC, DEMYSTIFYING EXOTIC DERIVATIVES:
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2016), http://www.rutterassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
Demystifying-Exotic-Derivatives-What-You-Need-to-Know.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ3T-QQVT]
(discussing four categories of nonuniform derivatives).
249 See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 5 prefatory note (AM LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977)
(discussing the need for uniformity); U.C.C. § 5-108 cmts. 1, 8-9 (explaining that UCC Article 5
changed its documentary review standard from “substantial compliance” to “strict compliance” to
eliminate the need for bank oﬃcers to exercise judgment).
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